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et al.: Disposable Income Test

Comments

Reasonably Necessary Expenses or Life of
Riley?: The Disposable Income Test and a

Chapter 13 Debtor's Lifestyle
[I]t was not the design of the Bankruptcy laws to allow the debtor to lead
the life of Riley while his creditors suffer on his behalf."
A common perception of a debtor in bankruptcy is that of an individual
who had an extravagant lifestyle and excessive expenditures that led to the
need for bankruptcy relief.2 The issues of lifestyle and spending habits are
perhaps most relevant when a debtor proposes a plan of reorganization under
Chapter 13 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code ("Code"). 3 Pursuant to Chapter 13,
a debtor may propose a plan where the debtor keeps all property and makes
specified payments from post-petition income to creditors over a three to five
year period.4 The debtor's income that is available to pay creditors under a

1. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984). Another court
expressed a similar sentiment when it stated that "a chapter 13 debtor who proposes
to pay his creditors 38 cents on the dollar cannot expect to go 'first class' when
'coach' is available." In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 622 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986).
2. For example, a commentator described this perception when he stated that "the
paradigmatic bankruptcy abuser is the free-spending swinger who finances his sybaritic
lifestyle at the expense of his creditors." Corish & Herbert, The Debtor'sDilemma:
DisposableIncome as the Cost of Chapter13 Dischargein ConsumerBankruptcy, 47
LA. L. REv. 47, 69 (1987).

One court commented in regard to a debtor's spending habits that the "debtor
seeks only to obtain relief from his past excesses and, given his monthly budget,
obviously intends to continue the extravagant lifestyle which has brought him here in
the first place." In re Ploegert, 93 Bankr. 641, 644 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988). Another
court criticized a proposed Chapter 13 plan because it "would have allowed the debtors
to retain the 'spoils of their 'buying spree," which caused the financial crisis while the
unsecured creditors would receive only 12 cents on the dollar." In re Rice, 72 Bankr.
311, 312 (D. Del. 1987).
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988).
For a good summary of the mechanics of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, see Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies:
Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "SubstantialAbuse", 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327,
330-36 (1985); Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 52.
4. One commentator explained as follows:
Chapter 13 is roughly comparable to chapter 11, in that both govern
"reorganization" bankruptcy proceedings, in which the debtor is allowed to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Chapter 13 plan is defined in the Code as "disposable income." s Disposable
income consists of the debtor's net income6 minus living expenses. Therefore,
the amount of the payments the debtor is able to make to creditors under a
Chapter 13 plan is directly related to the amount of the debtor's living
expenses. Since a debtor's lifestyle dictates the amounts expended for living
expenses, a debtor's lifestyle becomes an important issue in the confirmation
of a Chapter 13 plan.7
The role of the bankruptcy court in scrutinizing a debtor's lifestyle before
confirming a Chapter 13 plan is an unsettled issue. Because disposable
income is a factor in confirming a Chapter 13 plan, the court is often required
to examine the debtor's living expenses to determine whether they are
"reasonably necessary."8 The reasonably necessary standard raises two
questions about a court's discretion in determining disposable income under
a Chapter 13 plan: (1) whether the court should have such discretion, and (2)
if so, how much discretion should the court be allowed? Unfettered discretion
could lead to inconsistent standards and widely disparate results among the
many bankruptcy jurisdictions. This disposable income issue becomes more
complex in light of the objectives and policies of bankruptcy in general, and
Chapter 13 in particular. For example: What standard of living should a
bankruptcy court require of the debtor? What criteria should the court use in
determining an acceptable standard of living? Should Congress establish
objective guidelines in the interest of consistency? Should the court consider

retain assets in exchange for payments to be made to creditors from the
debtor's future income. As such, both differ from Chapter 7 "liquidation"
bankruptcies, in which the debtor loses non-exempt assets but is generally
freed from any further obligation to pay.
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 48. (citations omitted).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1988). See infra note 11 for the text of this Code
section. The method by which a court determines the amount of a debtor's disposable
income that is available to fund a Chapter 13 plan is commonly referred to as the
"disposable income test." In re Wood, 92 Bankr. 264, 266 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
6. A debtor's net income is often referred to as "take-home pay." The "net
income" references in this Comment refer to gross wages minus any payroll deductions
for such items as income taxes, FICA, and insurance.
7. After a debtor proposes a Chapter 13 plan, the court must confirm the plan for
execution. For the statutory requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, see
infra note 12 and accompanying text.
8. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1988), the debtor's living expenditures that are
not included in disposable income must be "reasonably necessary for the maintenance
or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." See infra note 11 for the full
text of this Code section. This test is referred to by courts and commentators as the
"reasonably necessary" standard. See, e.g., In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101, 107 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1981).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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geographical differences in costs of living? These and other considerations
are central to the disposable income determination: How should a court
determine reasonable and necessary living expenses for the Chapter 13 debtor?
This Comment will define and analyze the issues involved in determining
disposable income for the non-business Chapter 13 debtor.9 It will review the
statutory framework and legislative history of the disposable income test,
analyze whether any trends can be discerned from the disposable income
cases, and recommend an approach to the problem of calculating disposable
income.

I.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The starting point for the analysis of any statutory law is the statute itself.
Section 1325(b) of the Code exists within the framework of Chapter 13 as a
whole, and specifically, within the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter
13 plan. This section of the Comment will first examine the wording and
structure of section 1325 of the Code, and then review the legislative history
of section 1325(b).

9. Chapter 13 is also available for a sole proprietor debtor. The issues, however,
are slightly different. Because the majority of Chapter 13 petitions are predominately
filed by non-business debtors, this Comment will focus only on the non-business
context. One commentator noted that "business cases under Chapter 13 are relatively
rare." Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 91, 161 (1985).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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A. Section 13250
Section 1325(b) of the Code1 defines "disposable income" as the
amount of the debtor's post-petition income available to repay creditors. The
section 1325(b) disposable income requirement, however, must be understood
in the framework of that entire Code section. Section 1325 states the
requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. Subsection (a) 12 lists six

10. For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of the operation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) (1988), see Butler, A Chapter 13 Trustee Looks at Section 1325(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 401 (1989).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988) states in full:
(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects
to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan
unless, as of the effective date of the plan(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the
plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of
such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the three-year period
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the
plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, "disposable income" means
income which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably
necessary to be expended(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of
expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and
operation of such business.
Id.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988) states in full:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the
other applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28,
or by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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conditions that a Chapter 13 plan must satisfy: (1) conform to the other
provisions of Chapter 13, (2) pay all priority claim amounts in full over the
life of the plan, (3) be proposed in good faith (the "good faith" test),13 (4)
pay unsecured creditors at least as much as they would receive in a Chapter
7 liquidation (the "best interests" test), 4 (5) pay secured creditors the present
value of their secured claims over the life of the plan, and (6) be feasible for
the debtor to complete (the "feasibility" test).'5 If these conditions are met,
the court can confirm the plan. These conditions, however, do not require
payment to unsecured creditors in excess of Chapter 7 amounts, even if the
debtor would be able to make larger payments. Therefore, subsection (b), the
disposable income requirement, allows unsecured creditors to object to a plan
that pays nominal amounts when the debtor is capable of larger payments.
Also, under section 1325(b), either the trustee or an unsecured creditor
can object to confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan even though the plan satisfies
the conditions of section 1325(a).' 6 Thus, the disposable income test is not
a mandatory requirement of every Chapter 13 plan. If there is an objection,
however, the court may not confirm the plan unless either the plan proposes
to pay the objecting claimant in full or the plan commits all of the debtor's
disposable income to be received in a three-year period to the plan.'7
"Disposable income" is defined as income "not reasonably necessary to be
expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor."' 8 Every debtor must submit a schedule of income and expenses to
the court. The court is required, however, to evaluate that income and

(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain
the lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such
claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim
to such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to.make all payments under the plan and
to comply with the plan.
Id.
13. See infra note 33.
14. See infra note 30.
15. See infra note 31.

16. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (1988). See supra note 11 for the text of this Code
section.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(A) to -(B) (1988). See supra note 11 for the text of
this Code section.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1988). See supra note 11 for the text of this Code
section.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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expense schedule and determine disposable income only if the trustee or an
unsecured creditor objects to the confirmation of the plan.
The disposable income'evaluation is a two-step process.' 9 First, a court
must determine the debtor's projected income. In this step, questions may
arise about the inclusion in the debtor's projected income of overtime pay, pay
raises, and a spouse's income. 2 Second, once the court determines the
debtor's projected income, it must decide what living expenses the debtor can
deduct from the projected income to arrive at the debtor's disposable income.
At this point, the court must decide whether specific expenses are "reasonably
necessary" to support the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. This analysis
of living expenses requires the court's discretion in looking at the debtor's

lifestyle. One commentator has stated that "[t]he determination of disposable
21
income may be even more difficult than that of projected income."
B. Legislative History
The disposable income test was added to Chapter 13 of the Code by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"). 2
The most notable thing about the legislative history of the BAFJA is its lack
of history. One court stated that "the legislative history to section 1325(b) is
singularly vague and unenlightening." 23 Many commentators, however, have
examined the historical events and the House and Senate Conference Reports
leading up to the passage of the BAFJA. These commentators point to three
significant aspects of the history: (1) the influence of the consumer credit
industry, (2) the lack of formal recorded legislative history, and (3) the

19. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY para. 1325.08 (15th ed. 1989). See also In re
Fries, 68 Bankr. 676, 682 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
20. The objective of this Comment is to focus on the second step of the analysis.
For a discussion of what constitutes income for purposes of the disposable income test,
see Butler, supra note 10, at 406-10; Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 62-68;
Comment, Section 1325(b) and-Zero Payment Plans in Chapter 13, 4 BANKR. DEV.
L.J. 449, 457-63 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Zero Payment].
21. Collier, supra note 19, at para. 1325.08. Collier explains this difficulty as
follows:
As with projected income, the court, in theory, is required to project what
will happefn to the debtor's expenses over three years. Such a projection
would require the court to guess whether the debtor would have additional
children, unexpected marital separations, medical bills, home repairs, or a
wide variety of other future expenses. Obviously, this is impossible.
Id.
22. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
23. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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possibility of a congressional preference for an objective standard to determine
reasonably necessary expenses.

1. The Influence of the Consumer Credit Industry
The consumer credit industry 4 played a very significant role in advising
Congress on the need for changes to the 1978 Code. Although the Code was
the result of many years of careful drafting,25 outcries for amendment arose
almost immediately. There was a general concern in the industry that debtors
were abusing the purpose of bankruptcy by using the liberal provisions of the
Code to avoid paying debts that they were capable of paying. 26 In particular,
the consumer credit industry was concerned about what they perceived as
excessive discharges of unsecured debt in Chapter 7 bankruptcies.27 One
commentator remarked that "[m]any of the consumer bankruptcy amendments
were designed to rein in what some creditors saw as an excessive liberality
'
toward debtors in the original Bankruptcy Code. 12
One perceived inadequacy of the pre-BAFJA Code was that it did not
require a Chapter 13 plan to pay general unsecured creditors any greater

24. Although no single group officially represents the entire consumer credit

industry, the legislative hearings in conjunction with the BAFJA heard testimony from
a number of groups. These groups included the Credit Union National Association,
the National Association of Federal Credit Unions, the National Consumer Finance
Association, the American Retail Federation, and the National Retail Merchants
Association. Gross, Preservinga Fresh Startfor the IndividualDebtor: The Casefor
Narrow Constructionof the Consumer CreditAmendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 61
n.4 (1986).
25. One commentator stated that the Code "resulted from nearly a decade of study
and drafting." Morris, supra note 9, at 94.
26. A commentator summarized some excerpted comments symbolizing this credit
industry attitude:
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 37 (1981)
... ("[I]t appears that consumers may be taking advantage of the liberalized
law to escape burdens which could be assumed and which need not
necessarily lead to bankruptcy."); ... 130 CONG. REc. H7497 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984) (Congressman Brooks, speaking on the proposed bankruptcy
reforms, stated: "This bill will also make personal bankruptcy reforms by
eliminating the use of the bankruptcy system by debtors who are not
suffering economic hardship."). ...
Gross, supra note 24, at 61 n.5.
27. The Eighth Circuit noted that the amendments were passed in response to an
increasing number of Chapter 7 bankruptcies each year by non-needy debtors. In re
Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1989).
28. Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 47-48.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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amounts than they would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.29 The
"best interest" test of section 1325(a)(4) ° established a minimum standard
for payment to general unsdcured creditors under a Chapter 13 plan, but the
pre-BAFJA Code set no maximum standard for payment to them. Without a
maximum standard in the pre-BAFJA Code, the courts used one or more of
33
32
31
the so-called "feasibility test,, "best interest test," or "good faith test"
to determine whether a Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay enough to the
unsecured creditors. The result was a very wide discrepancy among the
Some courts confirmed plans that paid as
different bankruptcy districts.'

29. One commentator has written that "the major problem with section 1325 [of
the Code] was the absence of a meaningful standard for determining what portion of
the debtor's income he should devote to the plan." Comment, The Religious Debtor's
Conviction To Tithe as the Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEX. L. REV. 873,
876 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Religious Debtor's].
30. For the 611 text of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988), see supra note 12. Based
on this subsection, the debtor must propose in their Chapter 13 plan to pay unsecured
creditors at least as much as they would have received had the debtor liquidated under
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1224 (8th
Cir. 1987) ("Under the 'best interests of creditors' test of Chapter 13, a plan should
not be confirmed if the property to be distributed under the plan is less than the
amount each allowed unsecured creditor would be paid if the debtor's estate were
liquidated under Chapter 7.").
31. For the full text of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1988), see supra note 12. Based
on this subsection, the bankruptcy court has the authority to refuse to confirm a plan
if the court, in its discretion, determines that the debtor will not reasonably be able to
make payments for the term of the plan. Prior to the BAFJA, however, some
bankruptcy courts interpreted this section to allow them to deny confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan because the debtor could feasibly pay a greater dividend to the general
unsecured creditors.
32. See supra note 30.
33. For the full text of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988), see supra note 12. This
is a very broad and discretionary bankruptcy provision that allows a bankruptcy court
to deny confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan if, under the totality of the circumstances,
the court determines thit the debtor has not proposed the plan in good faith. This
section became the most widely used by the courts to increase the dividend to the
general unsecured creditors under Chapter 13 plans. Some courts would refuse to

confirm a Chapter 13 plan that proposed a nominal payment to the unsecured creditors
because the plan was not proposed in good faith in that the debtor could pay more.
One court stated that "prior to passage of the Bankruptcy and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984 ("BAFJA"), many courts used the so-called 'good faith test' to compel a
minimum repayment as a condition of confirmation." In re Pierce, 82 Bankr. 874, 878
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
34. One court noted that 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988) was added "in response to
the divergence of opinion among the courts as to the minimum level of payment
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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little as one percent to the general unsecured creditors, while other courts
required a substantial percentage repayment before they would confirm a
Chapter 13 plan.35
The consumer credit industry believed that the pre-BAFJA Code favored
debtors in two principal ways. First, they believed that consumers with few
assets and large incomes 31 were choosing to discharge debts under a Chapter
7 liquidation rather than to reorganize and repay creditors in a Chapter 13
plan.37 This perceived abuse was possible because Chapter 13 was completely voluntary. The courts, absent an application of a test such as "good
faith, 3 8 could not force debtors to file under Chapter 13 merely because the
debtors had the income potential to repay a substantial percentage of their
debts to general unsecured creditors. Thus, there was a concern that debtors
with the "ability to pay" in a Chapter 13 reorganization were opting instead
for a broad debt discharge under a Chapter 7 liquidation.39 Second, the
industry believed that Chapter 13 allowed for "cheap" reorganizations, because
there was no requirement that the amount paid to unsecured creditors exceed

what they would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.4" Debtors with
necessary to meet the good faith requirement of Section 1325(a)(3)." In re Reyes, 106
Bankr. 155, 158 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
35. One commentator stated as follows:
Both creditors and debtors reacted to these divergent interpretations of the
confirmation requirements [of section 1325 of the Code] by calling for a
more defined standard. Creditors wanted a standard that would ensure
meaningful repayments on unsecured obligations. Debtors sought a
standard that would not prohibit them from using Chapter 13 simply
because they were too poor to repay a set percentage of their unsecured
debts after considering their necessary financial obligations.
Comment, Religious Debtor's,supra note 29, at 877-78.
36. For a more thorough discussion of the high income/low asset debtor issue, see
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 81-82.
37. One commentator stated that the unsecured creditors criticized the Code in
that "it was 'too easy' to file for liquidation under Chapter 7; too many people who
'could pay' were liquidating just to 'shuck a couple of debts."' Corish & Herbert,
supra note 2, at 54 (citing In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984)).
38. See supra note 33.
39. See In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 872 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) ("The consumer
credit amendments.., were the offspring of congressional concern that credit costs
were being driven upwards by the ready availability of discharge via Chapter 7 to
persons seeking to sidestep consumer credit obligations who had the ability to pay.").
40. A commentator writing shortly after the passage of the BAFJA stated that
"while historically bankruptcy originated as a means to insure the equitable distribution
of a debtor's assets where those assets were insufficient to pay such debtor's debts in
full, it has presently evolved into a method of escaping those debts at little or no
sacrifice." Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 327-28 (citations omitted).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 3
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

small incomes and many assets could retain assets in a Chapter 13 reorganization with a minimal repayment to general unsecured creditors, because the
debtors had little income td devote to the plan. Thus, the consumer credit
industry believed that debtors were choosing either to propose Chapter 13
plans that paid very little to the general unsecured creditors, or to discharge
the general unsecured debt in Chapter 7 liquidations. Under either scenario,
the industry believed that the pre-BAFJA Code did not give general unsecured
creditors much return on their claims and that it was weighted in favor of
debtors.
As a result, the consumer credit industry began to lobby heavily for
changes in the Code. The industry gathered bankruptcy statistics to reinforce
their recommendations." One industry recommendation was that "to obtain
a discharge, all consumer debtors who had disposable income be required to
pay their creditors all of their income in excess of a somewhat adjusted
version of the federal poverty level for a period of several years."'42 This
recommendation represented the two general industry goals for bankruptcy
reform. First, debtors with incomes sufficient to pay more than a minimal
percentage to general unsecured creditors under a Chapter 13 plan should be
forced to reorganize under Chapter 13. 43 Second, the lifestyle of a Chapter
13 debtor should be reduced to a level only slightly above the recognized
poverty level in order to maximize the amount of income available to repay
unsecured creditors."4
2. Formal Legislative History
As already noted, the formal legislative history for the section 1325(b)
disposable income test is almost nonexistent. 45 One commentator noted that
"[t]he so-called Conference Report contains nothing more than the text of the
corrected bill that ultimately became law."' Prior to BAFJA, two Congressional bills had proposed changes in the requirements for Chapter 13 plan
confirmation. Although never enacted, the bills did include some discussions
recorded in their formal legislative histories. In December of 1981, S. 2000

41. The most significant and most quoted study was one conducted by the
business school at the University of Purdue often referred to as the "Purdue Study."
CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE
UNIVERSITY, MONOGRAPHS No. 23-24, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (1982).

42. Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 54 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 74.

44. Id.
45. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the BAFJA, see Gross,
supra note 24.
46. Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 336 (citation omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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was introduced in the 97th Congress. The bill proposed that a debtor would
not be permitted to file under Chapter 7 if "he could pay a reasonable portion
of his prepetition debts out of anticipated future income., 47 The Senate
Report for S. 2000 indicated that a 75% repayment of non-mortgage debt
would be presumed a "reasonable portion" and a 25% repayment would be
presumed unreasonable.4 The bill would have given the bankruptcy court
discretion to determine whether an amount between 25% and 75% was a
reasonable repayment of non-mortgage debt. 49 No action was taken on S.
2000 in the 97th Congress, so it was reintroduced as S. 445 in the 98th
Congress. In response to criticism that the "anticipated future income" test of
S. 2000 would not work, an amendment replaced that test with the "substantial
abuse" test for dismissal of a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding." Congress,
however, did not pass S. 445.
The real impetus for amendment to the Chapter 13 plan confirmation
portion of the Code came from the Supreme Court's decision in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.5 In Marathon, the
Court held that the expanded jurisdiction given federal bankruptcy courts
under the Code was unconstitutional.52 The Court stayed, however, the
effect of its decision until December 1982, to give Congress time to revise the
bankruptcy court system.53 Thus, the need to quickly reform the bankruptcy
court system, together with the lobbying efforts of the consumer credit
industry, led Congress to hastily adopt BAFJA without much formal
legislative history.54 "Basically, Congress adopted the proposals of the
National Bankruptcy Conference"55 as the BAFJA amendments to Chapter
13 of the Code.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 346.
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88; United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 1094 (1982).
One commentator noted that "Congress was in such a hurry to adopt H.R.

5174, the BAFJA bill, that it failed to provide any official legislative reports explaining

the new law." Comment, ReligiousDebtor's,supra note 29, at 875 (citations omitted).
See also In re Busbin, 95 Bankr. 240, 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) ("amidst the
frenetic legislating in 1984 to amend the Bankruptcy Code to overcome the
constitutional defect identified in [Northern Pipeline] .
Consumer Credit Amendments.. .. ").

. .

. Congress passed the

55. Comment, The DisposableIncome Test: An Attempt Toward Uniformity, 4
BANKR. DEv. J. 221, 222 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Disposable Income].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Under BAFJA, the consumer credit industry succeeded in getting sections
707(b)5 6 and 1325(b)57 added to the Code.5 8 Section 707(b) allows a court
to dismiss a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding sua sponte if a discharge would
be a "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7.59 The credit industry hoped that this
"substantial abuse" test would allow bankruptcy courts to deny liquidation
treatment to a debtor who had stable income and few assets that would be
liquidated in a Chapter 7, thereby reducing the number of debtors who were

using bankruptcy to avoid paying creditors in a Chapter 13 reorganization.
Section 1325(b) added the disposable income requirement. The credit industry
believed this requirement would force debtors in a Chapter 13 reorganization
to commit more than a nominal amount of their income to the plan.' The

56. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) states in full:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by
the United States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party
in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this
chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by the debtor.
Id.
57. For the text of this section, see supra note 11.
58. "Congress adopted many of the credit industry's proposed reforms in 1984
when it passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984."
Morris, supra note 9, at 95. Another commentator has maintained that "the confluence
of a disastrous economy, a conservative political environment, and pressure created by
two Supreme Court decisions, together with some legitimate creditor concerns over the
operation of the Code, assisted the credit industry in successfully lobbying for major
changes in the treatment of individual debtors." Gross, supra note 24, at 82. See also
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 55.
59. Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 55.
60. One commentator stated as follows:
Largely known as the 'ability-to-pay test,' Section 1325(b) was adopted by
Congress almost verbatim from a proposal made by the National Bankruptcy Conference ("NBC") at Hearings Before the Judiciary Committee. The
NBC urged that debtors only be allowed to avail themselves of the liberal
provisions of Chapter 13 if they pay creditors what they are reasonably able
to pay from their future income. According to the NBC, correlating a

debtor's right to Chapter 13 relief to his ability to pay from future
disposable income made sense because most unsecured credit was actually
extended based on the debtor's ability to pay from future income.
Comment, Zero Payment, supra note 20, at 455 (citations omitted).
One court stated that "[tihis modification [11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988)] came into
being because of the reaction of Congress to perceived abuses in Chapter 13 plans and
more particularly the so-called 'zero payment' and minimal payment plans." In re
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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disposable income test was intended, at least in part, to increase the dividend
to unsecured creditors, and is often referred to as the ability-to-pay test.6'

3. The Congressional Reference to Department of Labor Statistics
Due to a lack of formal legislative history for BAFJA, bankruptcy courts
have debated whether Congress intended courts to use an objective standard
to determine reasonably necessary expenses under the disposable income test.
The courts have interpreted the disposable income test as a congressional
attempt to settle the issue of how much income a Chapter 13 debtor must
commit to his Chapter 13 reorganization plan." One court noted that "the
new subsection [1325(b)] incorporates into chapter 13 the 'ability to pay' test,
which requires debtors to pay as much as they are able, but only as much as
they are able."63 That court noted that the history of the disposable income
test presumes "'a substantial effort by the debtor to pay his debts', and
'64
furthermore, '[s]uch an effort may require some sacrifices by the debtor."

Tracey, 66 Bankr. 63, 66 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
61. In adopting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988), Congress noted that "the present
proposal is that the ability-to-pay test, once invoked by the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim, should serve as the standard for determining whether the debtor is
reasonably capable of paying more than originally proposed." PersonalBankruptcy:
OversightHearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Monopolies and CommercialLaw of

the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 213 (1981-82).
One court stated that "[t]his new provision [Section 1325(b)] is referred to as the
'ability to pay' or 'disposable income' test." In re Ashton, 85 Bankr. 766, 768 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1988) (citation omitted).
62. "11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) represents Congress' attempt to statutorily resolve issues
relating to the appropriate minimum requirements for funding a chapter 13 plan from
a debtor's postpetition income." In re Navarro, 83 Bankr. 348, 354 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988) (citations omitted). Prior to BAFJA, the courts had debated whether a nominal
or zero-payment plan would pass a good faith test. See Comment, Zero Payment,
supra note 20.
63. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
64. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 65, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1983)). See also In re
Navarro, 83 Bankr. 348, 354 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing S. Rep. No. 65, 98th
Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1983)).
The Navarro court also commented as follows: Chapter 13 relief is essentially
equitable, and contemplates a substantial effort by the debtor to pay his debts. Such
an effort, by definition, may require some sacrifices by the debtor, and some alteration
in prepetition consumption levels. Thus, the debtor might reasonably be required to
devote to the plan that portion of his income which is not necessary for support of the
debtor and his family. The courts may be expected to determine norms for such
support, and Labor Department cost of living figures may provide some help. This
approach will also permit plans to be confirmed where the debtor does make a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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The courts have been unable to decide, however, whether Congress intended
the use of an objective standard to determine necessary expenses. This
uncertainty regarding congressional purpose has produced inconsistency
among the bankruptcy jurisdictions.
The issue regarding objective criteria for determining reasonable expenses
is further complicated because Congress made a reference to the Department
of Labor cost of living statistics as the standard for determining whether the
debtor's expenses during the Chapter 13 plan are reasonable.65 This
reference to the Department of Labor statistics has been interpreted by a few
courts and commentators to mean that Congress intended some sort of base
line average standard to be applied when analyzing living expenses for a
Chapter 13 plan.66 The bankruptcy courts, however, have not adopted
objective criteria to evaluate the reasonableness of the debtor's living expenses
under a Chapter 13 plan. Perhaps Congress' refusal to clarify what it meant
by "reasonably necessary" is an indication that Congress intended the courts
to use discretion in evaluating expenses under a Chapter 13 plan.67 It is also
significant that Congress did not adopt the consumer credit industry's
recommendations of either a poverty level standard of living for a Chapter 13
debtor or a forced Chapter 13 reorganization.6 By failing to require specific
levels of expenditure or mandatory Chapter 13 for certain types of debtors,
Congress may have been expressing a desire to allow bankruptcy courts to
evaluate expenses on a case-by-case basis.
II. CASE LAW
Bankruptcy courts have been forced to consider "what standard is to be
applied in determining the portion of a debtor's income that is not reasonably
necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents" 69 because the legislative history for the disposable income test

substantial effort to pay his debts, even though the payment itself is not substantial.).
Navarro, 83 Bankr. at 354 (citation omitted).
65. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983).
66. See, e.g., In re Fries, 68 Bankr. 676, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
67. One commentator stated that "the inherent ambiguity in the definition of
disposable income allows judges to tailor the repayment plan to the circumstances of
each debtor." Comment, ReligiousDebtor's,supra note 29, at 882 (citation omitted).
68. Following a discussion of the credit industry's suggestions to Congress for
changes to the Code, one commentator stated that "[i]n the end, the concepts of forced
reorganization and mandatory payment standards were largely rejected." Corish &
Herbert, supra note 2, at 55.
69. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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is both vague and unenlightening. 0 Courts will often discuss the disposable
income test in determining whether a Chapter 7 case should be dismissed as
"substantial abuse" 71 or whether a Chapter 13 case has been proposed in
"good faith."72 Whatever the context, bankruptcy courts evaluating proposed
Chapter 13 expenditures for reasonableness under the disposable income test
have used one of three approaches to reach the determination.
At one extreme, 73 some courts take the position that only luxury items
should be disallowed as unnecessary expenses. 74 Under this approach, the
court reviews the debtor's schedule of expenses and is concerned only when
there are luxury expenditures in the budget. Probably the best expression of
this approach is the often quoted language from the leading commentary on
the Code:
Hence, a court determining the debtor's disposable income is not expected
to, and should not, mandate drastic changes in the debtor's lifestyle to fit
some preconceived norm for chapter 13 debtors. The debtor's expenses
should be scrutinized only for luxuries which are not enjoyed by an average
American family.... Indeed, where a debtor's total household income is
only a modest amount, the court should be reluctant to impose its own
values with respect to any expenditures, even those which seem unnecessary; the debtor's choice to make such expenditures rather than spending a
greater amount on, for example, housing or clothing expenses which the

court would find reasonable, is not one with which the court should
interfere.

70. One commentator remarked that "[n]either the Bankruptcy Code nor the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act provides any significant
guidance to the bankruptcy courts concerning the reasonableness issue." Morris, supra
note 9, at 157. See also Collier, supra note 19, at para. 1325.08 ("[t]he legislative
history gives little guidance as to what is meant by this term [reasonably necessary].").
71. One court noted the following:
The disposable income inquiry conducted in reviewing Chapter 13 petitions
under Code § 1325(b) is similar to that used to review Chapter 7 petitions
for substantial abuse under Code § 707(b). This is because one of the
determinations to be made in a Chapter 7 substantial abuse review is
whether the petition might be better filed under Chapter 13 or Chapter 11.
'The primary factor that may indicate a substantial abuse is the ability of
the debtor to repay the debts out of future disposable income.' (footnote
omitted).
In re Sutliff, 79 Bankr. 151, 158 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (citations omitted).
72. In re Little, 116 Bankr. 615, 618-20 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
73. One commentator noted that this approach has not been widely adopted by
the courts. Comment, DisposableIncome, supra note 55, at 230.
74. One commentator referred to this approach as being "discharge oriented."
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 61.
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In short, the court cannot and should not order debtors to alter their
lifestyles where there is no obvious indulgence in luxuries, even where one
or more unsecured creditors demand such a change. To engage in such
close judgments and supervision would be to contravene the intent of
Congress. It would also place impossible burdens on the court in
determining the absolute necessity of every expense in each debtor's budget.
Since the views of judges on such value-laden issues differ significantly,
such an interpretation of the amendments would contravene their purpose
of restoring nationwide uniformity to chapter 13. 75
Thus, this approach maintains that a court should not impose its values on the
debtor except in cases of obvious luxuries or extravagance. 765 This is often
referred to as the "narrow 7 7 interpretation of disposable income because it
is based on the discretion of the debtor, with minimal restraint from the
court.78
A second approach, known as the "broad" interpretation,7 9 takes the
opposite extreme. Courts advocating this position state that they should use
broad discretion and impose their values on the debtor's budget to ensure the
debtor is only proposing expenses for life's basic necessities." The objective
is for the court to examine every expense category to eliminate any expenditure that is not absolutely necessary for the support and maintenance of the
debtor or his dependents. The premise is that the debtor should be reduced
to a basic lifestyle to minimize expenses and thereby maximize the amount of
disposable income available to pay general unsecured creditors. 1 This is the

75. Collier, supra note 19, at § 1325.08.
76. "In general, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) should not be considered a mandate for a
court to superimpose its values and substitute its judgment for those of the debtor on

basic choices about appropriate maintenance and support." In re Navarro, 83 Bankr,
348, 355 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (footnote omitted).
77. Id.
78. For a more thorough discussion of this approach, see Gross, supra note 24,
at 130-40.
79. Id. at 122-30.
80. "Several courts have interpreted the reasonably necessary standard to include
only those expenses for basic needs not related to the debtor's former status in society
or lifestyle to which he is accustomed." In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 157 (Bankr. N.D.
11. 1989). One commentator explained this approach by stating that it permits "a court
to substitute its own judgment for that of the debtor as to the propriety of the type and
amount of the debtor's expenditures." Morris, supra note 9, at 122.
81. One commentator characterized this approach as being "collection oriented."
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 61.
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approach adopted by a majority of the courts that have considered the
reasonableness of a debtor's expenditures in a Chapter 13 plan. 2
The leading case advocating the broad interpretation, In re Jones,1 was
the first attempt by a court to address the disposable income test after the
effective date of BAFJA. The court turned to section 522(d)(10)(E) of the
Code for guidance in defining reasonably necessary expenses.' That section
exempts from the bankruptcy estate certain benefit payments made to the
debtor, such as pension plan assets, "to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependents of the debtor." 5 The Jones court
noted that the "reasonably necessary" standard was first interpreted in In re
Taf 6 as standing for the proposition that "the appropriate amount to be set
aside for the debtor ought to be sufficient to sustain basic needs not related
to [the debtor's] former status in society or the life style [sic] to which he is
accustomed. 87 The court then stated that "the purpose of chapter 13 is to
provide the maximum recovery to creditors while at the same time leaving the
debtor sufficient money to pay for his or her basic living expenses. '
According to this standard, as enunciated in Jones, a court should eliminate
any expense not necessary for basic living and reduce any expense that is in
excess of the average lifestyle. This approach does not give any weight to the
debtor's former standard of living; rather, it seeks to maximize the dividend
for general unsecured creditors.
A third approach takes the middle ground. Courts advocating this
approach treat the disposable income test as a factual determination that varies
debtor-by-debtor and case-by-case.8 9 This approach is most appropriately
characterized as the "totality of the circumstances" approach.' Courts using

82. See Comment, Disposable Income, supra note 55, at 230.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

55 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
Id. at 466.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
Jones, 59 Bankr. at 466.

88. Id.

89. One commentator explained the following:
[t]he proper amount for an expense that satisfies a basic need 'is a fact
question that must be determined in the individual context of each debtor
and his dependents,' taking into consideration the economic conditions in
the debtor's geographic area and the amount that an average family in
similar circumstances might reasonably expect to spend in order to maintain
a reasonable standard of living.
Comment, ReligiousDebtor's,supra note 29, at 886 (quoting In re Sutliffe, 79 Bankr.
151, 158 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
90. "What is reasonably necessary is a question of fact and depends on the totality
of circumstances of the individual debtor's case." In re Bien, 95 Bankr. 281, 283
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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this totality-of-the-circumstances approach focus on the debtor's behavior in
proposing the plan, past spending habits and desire to repay creditors. 9' This
approach is a compromise between the other two extremes and it is relatively
In effect, it is somewhat of an equitable
recent in its development.'
approach to the "reasonably necessary" determination. 93
The objective is to examine each expense category on its own merits and
allow the debtor some semblance of his regular lifestyle within the confines
of the average lifestyle in the debtor's geographical area. 4 For example, in
an analysis of proposed recreation expenses in a Chapter 13 plan, one court
stated that "the amount of recreation in each Chapter 13 budget is a fact
question that must be determined in the individual context of each debtor and
his dependents." 95 One court proposed the following set of factors for
consideration when using the totality of the circumstances approach:
While a court should not lightly substitute its judgment for that of the
debtor, section 1325(b) mandates that it do so when any one of the
following factors is present:
a. the debtor proposes to use income for luxury goods or services;
b. the debtor proposes to commit a clearly excessive amount to non-luxury
goods or services;
c. the debtor proposes to retain a clearly excessive amount of income for
discretionary purposes;

(Bankr. D. Conn. 1989). Another court stated the following: "[w]hen a determination
of disposable income is presented to the Court as a contested matter, each case must
be examined upon the evidence presented. The Court will determine under the totality
of the circumstances whether the debtor's expenses were reasonably necessary for
family support."
In re Kuhlman, 118 Bankr. 731, 739 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990).
91. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 157 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) ("The
Debtor's proposal to continue his indifference, or lack of commitment, to creditors
through a Chapter 13 does, however, violate the disposable income requirement.").
92. As an example of this approach, one court reasoned that although "there are
some monthly expenditures quite out-of-line for the norm .... It]he basic factual issue
... is whether the total picture is abusive." Waites v. Braley, 110 Bankr. 211, 215
(E.D. Va. 1990) (court's emphasis).
93. "These judgments are guided by the court's sense of equity, which lies at the
foundation of all bankruptcy law." In re Sutliff, 79 Bankr. 151, 157 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1987).
94. For example, in an analysis of recreation expenses proposed in a Chapter 13
plan, one court stated that the proposed amount in this case (more than six and onehalf percent of the debtor's net income) was "a high and unreasonable sum for
entertainment, in light of Debtor's single marital status and the regional cost of living
in the area where he resides." Id. at 158.
95. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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d. the debtor proposes expenditures which would not be made but for a
desire to avoid payments to unsecured creditors;
e. the debtor's proposed expenditures as a whole appear to be deliberately
inflated and unreasonable.9
These factors are an example of a court attempting to combine flexibility
based on an individual debtor's situation, together with certain outer
parameters that are assumed to govern all reasonable debtor expenditures.
In reality, the reasonably necessary determination for Chapter 13
proposed expenditures is a two-step analysis. First, in the "qualitative" step,
the court must determine whether the expense itself is necessary for the
support of the debtor and his dependents. In this step, the court must
determine what types of expense categories will be allowed as reasonable
living expenses in a Chapter 13 plan. Second, in the "quantitative" step, once
an expense category is determined to be necessary, the court must decide how
much the debtor may expend within the category. In this step, the court must
examine a debtor's Chapter 13 budget to make sure the amount proposed to
be spent in a reasonable category of expenditure is a reasonable amount.
The cases since BAFJA have developed certain categories of expenses
that the bankruptcy courts consider reasonably necessary. Also, these same
cases generally discuss the amount of expenditure within each expense
category that the court will approve as reasonable. Thus, the cases provide a
basis to examine whether the courts have established any definable standards
for lifestyle expenditures in a debtor's Chapter 13 plan. The following is an
analysis of the categories and amounts discussed by the courts in the context
of disposable income determinations. 97
A. Housing: Amounts Held Reasonable
The amount that a debtor expends on housing is, perhaps, the most
difficult category of expenditure to analyze and to set any meaningful
objective standard for measuring reasonableness. Housing costs are extremely

96. In re Navarro, 83 Bankr. 348, 355-56 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (citations
omitted). The court noted that "[t]hese factors are not meant to be exclusive, but
rather.a guide to relevant considerations in evaluating a case under section 1325(b)."
Id. at 355 n.11.
97. All the cases examined specifically discuss disposable income and reasonably
necessary expenses. Many of the cases, however, are actually determinations of good
faith or substantial abuse. Because the courts often consider disposable income
relevant to a determination of substantial abuse or good faith, they will discuss the
debtor's ability to pay under a Chapter 13 plan in light of the debtor's submitted
budget. The discussion of the debtor's ability to pay necessitates an analysis of the
debtor's income and reasonably necessary living expenses.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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sensitive to location, both geographically around the country and within a
particular city.98 Also, the neighborhood where a family chooses to live is
often dictated by such considerations as proximity to work and quality of the
school district. 99 Consequently, the bankruptcy courts very seldom refuse to
confirm a plan because of the amount a debtor is expending for housing. For
example, one court considered a $1433 per month home mortgage reasonable
for a family of five,"° and another court held that $1255 per month for a
house payment and $241 per month for utilities for a family of four was

reasonably necessary."' The same is true for debtors who rent. The courts
almost never refuse to confirm a plan because of unreasonable expenditures
for rent. For example, one court held that a rent and utilities payment of

98. Corporations experience this cost differential when they transfer employees
from one area of the country to another. Often, corporations must pay salary
differentials because housing costs vary so much among the different regions of the
country. For example, expenditures for housing generally are much less in the
Midwest than either Los Angeles or New York City.
99. "The debtor also may have a legitimate interest in staying in a particular
location to obtain noneconomic benefits such as a superior school system." Morris,
supra note 9, at 159.

100. In re Stein, 91 Bankr. 796, 803 n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). The court
refused to confirm the plan because of excessive food and transportation expenses but
did not deem the housing expenditure to be excessive. Id. at 802-03. The debtor's
plan proposed a 10% dividend to general unsecured creditors. Id. at 797.
101. In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). It is important to
note that the case was in California and that housing costs in that state are among the
highest in the nation. The expenditure was considered reasonable even though the plan
proposed a 1% dividend to general unsecured creditors. Id. at 549.
Other examples of expenditures for home mortgages held reasonable by the courts
include: In re Killough, 900 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1990) ($262.07 per month for a
family of two); In re Gyurci, 95 Bankr. 639, 640 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) ($810 per
month for a family of five); In re Sustek, No. 87-03864, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. D.S.C.
March 29, 1988) ($1,487); In re Wood, 92 Bankr. 264, 266 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)
($1,004 per month for a family of three); In re Easley, 72 Bankr. 948, 949 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1987) ($321 per month for a single debtor); In re Rogers, 65 Bankr. 1018,
1022 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) ($522.58 per month for a single debtor, including $324
for a first mortgage and $198.58 for a second); In re Fries, 68 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1986) ($1,000 per month for a family of five); In re Walton, 69 Bankr. 150, 152
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986), aff'd, 866 F.2d 981 (1989) ($350 per month for a family of
four); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) ($900 per month for
a family of four); In re Schyma, 68 Bankr. 52, 57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ($552 per
month for a family seven); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984)

($671 per month for a family of four).
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$350 per month for a single debtor was reasonable even though the debtor
paid it to her father."°
The bankruptcy courts can, however, hold extravagant or luxurious
expenditures for housing to be unreasonable. For example, in In re
Krohn,103 subsequent to a Chapter 7 petition, the debtors sold a $98,500
condominium and reinvested the $19,701 gain in a new $156,000 residence.'0 4 Although it was not a Chapter 13 disposable income case, the
court commented that the debtor's behavior did not exhibit any sincere effort
to control expenses in an honest effort to repay creditors.10 5 The debtor had6
$143,000 in unsecured debts on credit cards and other bank credit lines.'0
The court dismissed the case as a substantial abuse of Chapter 7 and stated
that the housing expenditure was extravagant and "in excess of a reasonable
standard of living."' 0 7
In another line of cases, some courts have refused to confirm a Chapter
13 plan when debtors upgraded their housing very shortly before filing their
bankruptcy petitions. In In re Rice,1°s the debtors purchased a new home
four months before filing their Chapter 13 petition.'0 9 The purchase

102. In re Sturgeon, 51 Bankr. 82, 83 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985). The creditor
objected to the expense because the debtor had previously lived rent-free with her
father. Id. The court stated that "if she would move out, she would have to commit
that amount she is presently paying her father for rental expenses." Id.
Other examples of rent expenditures held by the courts to be reasonable include:
In re Sutliff, 79 Bankr. 151, 153 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ($350 per month for a single
debtor); In re Struggs, 71 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) ($280 per month
for a single debtor); hi re Peluso, 72 Bankr. 732, 733 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ($250
per month for a family of two); In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 74-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1986) ($325 per month for a family of five); In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634, 635
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ($465 per month for a family of two).
103. 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989). This was actually a determination of
"substantial abuse" in regard to a Chapter 7 petition. Id. at 125.
104. Id. In connection with the purchase, the debtors reaffirmed a $19,626
unsecured Mastercard debt with the mortgage lender. Id.
105. Id. at 127-28 ("At no point in the debtor's history, either before or after
filing for chapter 7 relief, has the debtor shown a sincere resolve to repay his
obligations and/or to reduce his monthly expenses."). The court was considering
whether to dismiss the Chapter 7 case as a substantial abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)
(1988). Krohn, 886 F.2d at 125.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 127. Another court found that a $989 per month mortgage payment
was "well above the amount necessary to provide adequate housing for a family of
four." In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 464, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
108. 72 Bankr. 311 (D. Del. 1987).
109. Id. at 312.
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increased their monthly mortgage payment from $650-$700 per month to over
$1,100 per month. 1 The debtors' Chapter 13 plan proposed to keep the
house and "two relatively new automobiles, while the unsecured creditors got
no more than 13 cents on the dollar."'1 The bankruptcy court had found
that "[t]he Debtors' plunge into bankruptcy was precipitated by the attempt to
enhance their lifestyle by purchasing a new home .

. .

.

Now, Debtors

propose a Plan that would permit them to maintain this recently acquired
lifestyle at the expense of the unsecured creditors." '
The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of plan confirmation because the
debtors had an ability to make payments greater than those proposed in their
Chapter 13 plan.113 The court stated that "[a] Plan which allows Debtors to
keep the spoils of this purchase, while the unsecured creditors receive only 13
cents on the dollar, is not a Plan that can be confirmed by this Court," 4
Another court dismissed a Chapter 7 case under section 707(b) of the Code
because the debtor attempted to upgrade his housing expenditures by moving
into a more expensive apartment shortly after filing the Chapter 7 petition.
The court held that the higher rent was an attempt by the debtor to inflate
expenses to make it appear he did not have any disposable income with which
to fund a Chapter 13 plan."1
The cases in which the bankruptcy courts have found housing expenditures excessive are the exception to the rule. Absent any obviously extravagant amount or any attempt to upgrade through bankruptcy, the cases indicate
that bankruptcy courts approve the debtor's housing expenditures as
reasonable and thereby defer to the debtor's judgment as to where to live.
One issue that courts and attorneys should consider when assessing a
debtor's housing expenditures is the possible adverse tax consequences of
forcing the debtor to sell a home and either rent or purchase a less expensive
home. The income tax advantages of deducting mortgage interest are often
a consideration when a family chooses the level of mortgage they can afford.
If a court required a debtor to sell a home and move into a less expensive
home to reduce expenses and increase disposable income, the debtor's
disposable income might actually be reduced because of the loss of the

110. Id.
111. Id. at 311.
112. Id. at 312.
113. Id. The District Court noted that this ability to pay would require the
debtors to sell their current home and purchase a new one in the price range of their

previous home. The court stated that "[tihe alternative is a return to the lifestyle
Debtors enjoyed, and seemed able to afford, before their financial turmoil began." Id.
114. Id. at 313.
115. In re Ploegert, 93 Bankr. 641, 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988). The debtor's
rent increased from $260 to $550 per month. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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income tax deduction, which could offset any reduction in expenses due to the
decreased mortgage payment.

16

In addition, the forced sale could cause a

loss of equity for the debtor because of the potential for a lower selling price
in a distressed sale situation." 7 These considerations led one commentator
to conclude that "when considering the reasonableness of a debtor's projected
housing costs . . . bankruptcy courts should consider not only the gross

reduction in living expenses, but also the potential loss of equity, moving
8
expenses, and noneconomic costs which any move would entail.""
One court addressed the income tax consequences of forcing a debtor to
sell an expensive home afid move to a less expensive home. 9 The debtors
had a family of four and a mortgage payment of $1677 per month on a 3,200
square foot home.120 The court noted that the debtors had decided to
"'stretch' their budget and to purchase a large home 'as an investment'' and
that "to make the large mortgage payments required and to maintain their
lifestyle, the debtors accumulated large credit card and charge account
debts.' 2 ' The debtors maintained that they could sell the home and move
into a $1,000 per month rental home. 22 They argued, however, that the lost
income tax deduction would increase their tax liability and, therefore, offset
any reduction in living expenses."23 The court concluded that the debtors'
mortgage payment was unreasonable and noted that they should be able to
rent a home for a family of four for less than $1,000 per month. 124 In its
discussion of the tax consequences, however, the court did not foreclose the
possibility that tax considerations could enter into a determination of whether
requiring less expensive housing would be warranted. The court implied that
the main factor in considering whether a debtor should sell a residence and

116. The income tax deduction for mortgage interest has the effect of reducing
a taxpayer's taxable income, and, consequently, the income tax liability. Thus, the loss
of an income tax deduction could increase the debtor's income tax liability. This
increased tax liability would reduce the debtor's net income and, thereby, offset any
reduction in the debtor's necessary living expenses that resulted from a move to less

expensive housing.
117. "If the debtor had to sell a residence in a tight real estate market, he
probably would lose a significant amount of equity in the home. Also, the debtor's

moving costs could outweigh the savings realized by reduced monthly rental or
mortgage payments." Morris, supra note 9, at 159 (footnote omitted).
118. 'Id.
119. In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986).
120. Id. at 616-17. The cost of the home was $180,000 and the principal balance
on the mortgage loan was $170,000. Id. at 616.

121. Id.
122. Id. at 618.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 621.
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move to a less expensive residence is whether the move would reasonably

increase the dividend to general unsecured creditors.'25
A debtor's housing expenditure is one expense category that the courts
could use an objective standard to judge reasonableness. Lenders commonly
use such a standard for approving residential loans; the loan will not be
approved if the monthly payment on the loan exceeds a certain percentage of
the borrower's monthly income.' 26 Using this same approach, bankruptcy
courts could establish a percentage limit to use in analyzing a debtor's
monthly housing expenditure. For example, they could use twenty-five
percent of net income as the percentage limit. 127 If the debtor's housing
expenditure was less than twenty-five percent of his net -income, the
expenditure would be presumed reasonable. The court would use its
discretion for cases in which the expenditure exceeded twenty-five percent of
net income, and compelling circumstances existed.
This approach is appealing for several reasons. First, the analysis would
be consistent nationwide because it is based on an objective standard. Second,
it would be consistent with lender practices. Third, this approach should help
compensate for geographical differences in housing costs because it is linked
to the debtor's income, and incomes generally fluctuate nationally to reflect
differences in costs of living. Finally, because the approach is tied to the
debtor's income, it allows the debtor discretion to choose housing commensurate with his or her income level. This approach, however, does present at
least one problem. Debtors in the lower income levels are more likely to
spend a larger percentage of their income on housing than are debtors in
higher income brackets. Lower income debtors may exceed the percentage
limitation standard even though they keep very tight control over other
expenses, while higher income debtors may meet the percentage limitation
standard even though they spend excessively in other areas. In this situation,
either the court could use its discretion to account for the lower income
discrimination, or the percentage limitation standard could be indexed by
income levels to account for the higher percentage expenditure required in the
lower income levels.
125. Id.
126. For example, in the Kansas City, Missouri area a common rule of thumb is
that the monthly mortgage payment cannot exceed 30% of the borrower's monthly
gross income.
127. An analysis of twenty cases, see supra notes 97-123, in which the court
discussed reasonable housing expenses indicated that the housing expenditure averaged
23.5% of net income. In four of the cases the expenditure exceeded 25% of net
income. In one case the expenditure was 46%. The debtor in that case, however, had
a net income of $760 per month. The percentage expenditure for mortgage payments
averaged approximately 5% more than that for rent payments. Thus, the 25% of net
income percentage limitation would not be inconsistent with past judicial results.
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B. Food: A Fairly ConservativeStandard

The bankruptcy court decisions considering what expenditures for food
are reasonably necessary have not been consistent. Courts scrutinize the
debtor's food budget closely. They consider the ages of any children involved
and the size of the family in determining an appropriate food budget.
Generally, the courts reject amounts that would appear excessive to almost any
reasonable person. 128 One court stated its standard of reasonableness for a
family with two children at home: "a low level budget for the Midwest would
yield $293.00 per four week period, a moderate level budget would yield
'
$368.00, and a liberal level $433.25. 129

128. Budgeted expenditures per month for food which the courts have held to be
unreasonable include: Waites v. Braley, 110 Bankr. 211, 215 (E.D. Va. 1990) ($700
per month for a family of four); In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 158 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1989) ($300 per month for a single debtor); In re Strange, 85 Bankr. 662, 663 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 1988) ($400 per month for a family of two); In re Stein, 91 Bankr. 796, 802
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ($780 per month for a family of five); In re Hudson, 64
Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) ($600 per month for a family of five); In re
Jones, 55 Bankr. 464, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ($515 per month for a family of
four); In re Shands, 63 Bankr. 121, 123 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) ($636 per month
for a family of three); In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) ($500
per month for a family of four with monthly income of 6,470).
By way of comparison, budgeted food expenditures held to be reasonable include:
In re Killough, 900 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1990) ($225 per month for a family of two);
In re LeMaire, 883 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1989) ($175 per month for a single

debtor); In re Gyurci, 95 Bankr. 639, 641 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) ($350 per month
for a family of three); In re Tefertiller, 104 Bankr. 513, 514 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)
($600 per month for a family of four); In re Peluso, 72 Bankr. 732, 733 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987) ($320 per month for a family of two); In re Easley, 72 Bankr. 948,
949 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) ($200 per month for'a single debtor); In re Struggs, 71
Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) ($250 per month for a single debtor.

However, the debtor did have some responsibilities for a dependent child from a recent
divorce); In re Sutliff, 79 Bankr. 151, 153 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ($100 per month
for a single debtor); In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) ($300
per month for a family of four); In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 617 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1986) ($400 per month for a family of four); In re Walton, 69 Bankr. 150, 152
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986) ($175 per month for a family of four); In re Tinneberg, 59
Bankr. 634, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ($175 per month for a family of two); In re
Schyma, 52 Bankr. 52, 57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ($300 per month for a family of
seven).
129. In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 395-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (citation

omitted). The debtor had budgeted $700 per month. The court considered many
expenses excessive and dismissed the Chapter 7 petition under the substantial abuse
standard of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988). Grant, 51 Bankr. at 395-96.
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Food expense is another expense category that the courts could establish
an objective standard for reasonableness. The standard should be established
on a per person basii rather than as a percentage of net income because food
expenses are a necessity that do not fluctuate according to income level. An
examination of 23 cases 130 that addressed the issue of food expenditures
indicates that the average amount budgeted was $191 per month per person.
The average amount spent per person for plans that the courts confirmed,
however, was $141 while the average for plans the courts refused to confirm
was $210. Based on this analysis, the courts seem to require a budgeted
amount somewhere between $100 and $150 per person. Thus, the courts
could establish a standard of $150 per month for the debtor plus $100 per
month for each additional dependent living with the debtor. Any amount
below this upper limit would be presumed reasonable. The court would use
discretion for any amount more than the upper limit in cases with compelling
circumstances.
The courts have held that food expenditures were excessive when they
included amounts for non-grocery items. For example, the courts are sensitive
to excessive expenditures for dining out. In one case, a single debtor
budgeted $433 per month for food."' The budget for food and recreation
included generous amounts for dining out each week.132 The court criticized
the dining-out expenditure and concluded that the debtor's living expenses

were "wildly extravagant and excessive.i133

In another case, the debtor

proposed an expenditure of $480 per month for food.134 That amount
included $50 per month at the grocery store and $430 per month for eating
out at restaurants. 35 The court criticized the amount as excessive and stated
that "the most that the Court can conclude is reasonably necessary ... is $300
per month." 36 Some courts have been critical of proposed food expenditures that include excessive amounts for cigarettes. One court criticized a
debtor's proposed food expenditures because a $700 per month budget for
food for a family with two children included $200 per month for cigarettes. 37 Another court refused to confirm a plan that included $97 per
month for cigarettes.1 3 The court reasoned that the cigarette expenditures

130. See supra notes 128-29 and infra notes 131-39.
131. In re Ploegert, 93 Bankr. 641, 643 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).
132. Id.
133. Id. See also Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 24-25 (the court criticized the debtor for
proposing $100 per month for dining out for a family of four).
134. In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 639 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 642.
137. Waites v. Braley, 110 Bankr. 211, 216 (E.D. Va. 1990).
138. In re Peluso, 72 Bankr. 732, 733 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
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were, in reality, recreation expenditures and that the debtor's plan already
1 39
included $100 per month for recreation.
C. Clothing: Courts Use Their Discretion
Courts have generally concluded that expenditures for purchasing,
laundering and dry cleaning clothing are a reasonable expense category. An

analysis of the cases, however, shows it is difficult to reach a conclusion as
to what level of expenditures per month the courts consider reasonable.
Clothing expenditures are directly related to the size of the debtor's family
and the debtor's type of employment. For example, a debtor employed in a
profession that requires a suit for work attire would have higher clothing
expenditures than a debtor employed in a manufacturing position or a position
that provided work uniforms. 40 Furthermore, expenditures for new clothing
are discretionary and are not as necessary for support as food and housing.
The courts should limit a Chapter 13 plan to very few expenditures for new
clothing to maximize the dividend to unsecured creditors. This is one expense
category where a little belt-tightening by the debtor is not a sacrifice of a
basic necessity.
Bankruptcy courts generally do not reject clothing expenditures as
excessive unless the expenditures are clearly unreasonable.'
An analysis

139. Id. at 738.
140. For example, one court criticized a proposed expenditure of $100 per month
for clothing for two debtors who were employed as assembly line workers at a General
Motors plant. In re Shands, 63 Bankr. 121, 123 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
141. For example, one court held that $416 per month for a single debtor
employed as a "parts chaser" for General Motors was excessive. In re Ploegert, 93
Bankr. 641, 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988). Another court concluded that $600 per
month for a debtor and his wife was excessive. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24-25
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
Other examples of monthly expenditures for purchasing and cleaning clothing
which have been rejected as unreasonable include: In re Helmick, 117 Bankr. 187, 190
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) ($290 per month for a family of two, neither of whom was
employed in a profession requiring the purchase of expensive clothing such as suits);
In re Stein, 91 Bankr. 796, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ($350 per month for a family
of five); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) ($565 per month

for a family of four); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 24-25 ($600 per month for a family
of four. The amount included $100 per month for laundry when the family owned a
washing machine.).
By way of comparison, amounts expended for purchasing and cleaning clothing
which the courts have concluded were reasonable include: In re Killough, 900 F.2d 61,
62 (5th Cir. 1990) ($55 per month for a family of two); In re LaMaire, 883 F.2d 1373,
1376 (8th Cir. 1989) ($20 per month for a single debtor); In re Gyurci, 95 Bankr. 641
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of. twenty cases 4 ' that discussed the debtor's budgeted expenditures for
purchasing and cleaning clothes indicate that the average expenditure as a
percentage of net income was six percent, and the average expenditure per
family member was $89 per month. The averages for cases where the plans
were not confirmed, however, was seven percent and $108 per person, while
the averages for cases where the plans were confirmed was four percent and
$28 per person. The courts could establish an objective standard such as four
percent of net income as a ceiling within which to evaluate budgeted clothing
expenditures. Any amount below that percentage would be presumed
reasonable. Because of variable factors such as work related needs, however,
this category may be one that the courts must use discretion in determining
the reasonableness of the amount expended.
D. Transportation:Generally Held Reasonable
Expenditures for transportation are an expense category universally
recognized by the courts as a necessary expense. The determination of a
reasonable amount, however, is complicated by the wide variety of transportation available to a debtor. Automobiles are available in price ranges from
very inexpensive to very expensive. In addition, a debtor can often sell an
expensive automobile and acquire a less expensive automobile without the
adverse tax consequences inherent in selling a home, as discussed supra in
Section II.A. of this Comment. Thus, this expense category is one which
primarily depends on the debtor's lifestyle decisions. The challenge for a
court is to decide what is a reasonable amount to expend for transportation
sources within the myriad of possible transportation available to the debtor.
In addition to lifestyle, the debtor's employment may require a more upscale
automobile than would be considered reasonably necessary for the average
debtor. For example, the debtor may need a newer and more reliable vehicle

(Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) ($145 per month for a family of five); In re Sutliff, 79 Bankr.
151, 153 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ($35 per month for a single debtor); In re Struggs,
71 Bankr. 96, 98 (Banker. E.D. Mich. 1987) ($105 per month for a single debtor); In
re Peluso, 72 Bankr. at 733 ($70 per month for a family of two); In re Easley, 72
Bankr. 948, 949 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) ($30 per month for a single debtor); In re
Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (the court held that $100 per month
for clothes and $75 per month for laundry and cleaning for a family of four was
reasonable); In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 74-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) ($130 per
month for a family of five); In re Walton, 69 Bankr. 150, 152 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986)
($65 per month for a family of four); In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634, 635 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986) ($40 per month for a family of two); In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 464
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ($290 per month for a family of five); In re Schyma, 52
Bankr. 52, 57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ($50 per month for a family of seven).
142. See supra notes 140-41.
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to travel a great distance to work. Another consideration is that an expeiditure for a new vehicle may cost less than extensive repairs on an old vehicle.
These and other considerations have made transportation expenditures an
expense category that is greatly dependent on the courts' discretion.
The bankruptcy courts allow transportation expenditures that are not
patently extravagant or luxurious. The courts generally approve the debtor's
current expenditures. 143 An analysis of twenty cases1' 4 that discussed
transportation expenditures indicates that the average expenditure proposed in
the Chapter 13 plans was fourteen percent of the debtor's net income. The
average percentage of net income for plans not confirmed by the courts,
however, was sixteen percent, while it was ten percent for the confirmed
plans. On the other hand, the courts reject as excessive transportation
expenditures that are obviously extravagant or are an attempt to upgrade
during bankruptcy.
A leading case on luxury expenditures for transportation is In re
Rogers.145 In Rogers, the debtor had a $440 per month payment on a twoyear-old red Corvette and a $180 per month payment on a two-year-old
Cavalier.' 46 As part of her proposed Chapter 13 plan, the debtor proposed
to sell the Cavalier and pay the secured creditor. 47 The debtor, however,
planned to retain the Corvette.' 4 She argued that "the Bankruptcy code
does not require a debtor to dispose of all of life's little pleasures in order to
qualify for Chapter 13 relief.' 49 The court stated that "the problem is not
the description or even the worth of the asset--it's the size of the debt on
it."' 50 The court concluded that "it's the payment-not the possession of an

143. Some examples of budgeted transportation expenditures held reasonable by
the courts include: Ploegert, 93 Bankr. at 643 ($250 per month payment and $85 per
month for insurance and repairs on a single auto); In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 617
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988) ($458 per month payment and $60 per month for insurance
for two autos); Peluso, 72 Bankr. at 733, ($250 per month for a five-year-old car);
Greer, 60 Bankr. at 549 ($300 per month payment and $146 per month for auto
insurance for a nine-year-old Ford and a three-year-old Toyota); Jones, 55 Bankr. at
464 ($175 per month payment and $110 per month maintenance and gasoline for a
single auto); Walton, 69 Bankr. at 152 ($150 per month for transportation); Schyma,
52 Bankr. at 57 ($543 per month for two used vehicles. One debtor commuted 600+
miles weekly to work).
144. See supra note 141 and infra notes 144-170.

145. 65 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1986).
146. Id. at 1019-20.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1020.

149. Id.
150. Id. The debtor valued the car at $14,000 and owed $17,158.97 on it. Id.
The court stated that "if the debtor here owned the 'Vette' free and clear, so long as
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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asset-which is material in an objection under § 1325(b)."'1 5' Finally, the
court explained that "the question is how much is a reasonable amount to pay
for basic transportation during the period of the Chapter 13 Plan?"'5 2 The
court held that $440 per month for a two-year-old red Corvette was not
reasonable.5 A significant statement by the court regarding its holding was
that car payments for basic transportation should not exceed $10,000 over a
four year period.5 4 Thus, it appears that the debtor's budget for transportation expenses must pass the "red Corvette" test.
Another case involving a luxury expenditure on an automobile was In re
Struggs.'5 In Struggs, the debtor proposed to continue $775 per month
payments on a late model Cadillac Fleetwood.' 5 6 The debtor's budget also
57
included $93 per month for insurance and $300 per month for gasoline.
The court noted that if the debtor used a non-luxury automobile, the
expenditures for insurance and fuel would decrease along with the monthly
payment. 15 The court held that reasonably necessary expenses for car
payment, maintenance, and fuel for basic transportation should not exceed
$300 per month. 5 9 Thus, the court established an objective standard of
$300 per month for operation of one vehicle.16° Further, another court

the plan called for paying more than the present value of the non-exempt portion of
its value to unsecured creditors, the creditors could not insist that she liquidate the
asset and pay the proceeds to them." Id. at 1021.
151. Id. at 1021. The creditors had argued that the debtor's decision to keep the
Corvette "evinces an intent by the debtor to maintain a hot lifestyle at their expense."
Id. at 1020.
152. Id. The court then stated that "this question unavoidably involves the
bankruptcy court in difficult value judgments." Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id.

154. Id. at 1021-22. The court stated that the excess over $10,000 for the
Corvette amounted to "luxury" or "recreation" expenses. Id.
155. 71 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
156. Id. at 98.

157. Id. at 98-99.
158. Id. at 99.

159. Id. at 98-99. The court cited its holding in In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 642
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
160. Other examples of budgeted expenditures for transportation held unreasonable by the courts include: In re Gyurci, 95 Bankr. 639, 640-641 (D. Minn. 1989)
($970 per month for all expenses to own and operate five vehicles for a family of five.
The children were ages 18, 23 and 25); In re Stein, 91 Bankr. 786, 803 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1988) ($465 per month for lease payments and $235 per month for maintenance
and insurance for one automobile); In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 395 ($490 per month
lease for a new Nissan and Cutlass Ciera and $400 per month for maintenance and
insurance); In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 976 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) ($450 per month for
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rejected $608 per month transportation expenses for a "luxury automobile" as
being unreasonable. 61 The court stated that "[g]iven an expected lease
payment on a standard car, plus gas and maintenance expenses, the Court
concludes that $300 per month is reasonably necessary for transportation."'6
These cases in which the courts held transportation expenditures
unreasonable illustrate the overriding objective of the courts' lifestyle
determination regarding transportation. The courts seek to increase the
dividend to general unsecured creditors without drastically altering the
debtor's lifestyle. Transportation, however, is one expense category where the
courts can increase the dividend with very little sacrifice by the debtor. This
is possible because good, reliable, transportation is available at less than
extravagant prices.
One court addressed the issue of a debtor attempting to upgrade his
transportation through bankruptcy. In In re Reyes,16 just before filing a
Chapter 13 petition the debtor purchased a new Chevrolet Blazer at a monthly
payment of $472.'64 The debtor's plan proposed to pay a ten percent
dividend to the general unsecured creditors. The court noted that the type of
vehicle was not required by the debtor's employment 65 and it concluded
that "[t]he Blazer is an 'obvious indulgence' if ever ever there was one..."
and that "[t]he Debtor purchased the Blazer simply because he wanted to drive
an extravagant four wheel drive vehicle."' 66 The court held that the expense
was unreasonable because "the sole purpose of filing was to retain the recently
purchased Blazer and to make only nominal payments to the unsecured
creditors." 67
In another case with an unpublished opinion, the Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Missouri denied confirmation of a plan in which the
debtor proposed to purchase a vehicle as part of a Chapter 13 plan.' 6 The
debtor did not own a car prior to filing a Chapter 13 petition.169 In denying

a one-year-old Oldsmobile); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 24-25 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984)
($731 per month for two Buicks less than one year old).
161. In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 642 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 198).
162. Id.
163. 106 Bankr. 155 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1989).
164. Id. at 156. The plan also included a $120 budgeted expenditure for
maintenance and gasoline. Id.
165. Id. at 157 ("The Debtor did not purchase the four wheel drive Blazer to
provide a reliable means of transportation to work, for he lived three miles from work
and presumably near paved roadways.").
166. Id. at 157-58.
167. Id. at 156.
168. In re Johnson, Case No. 89-41436-W-13 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
169. Id. The debtor had spent $78 per month prior to bankruptcy using
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confirmation, the court stated that "those living arrangements which the debtor
enjoyed prior to filing are the standard form [sic] which the next three to five
years should be judged, not the enhanced arrangements to which we all
aspire."' 170 These decisions indicate that a court will determine if an
expensive vehicle is required for employment reasons, and will not allow a
debtor to upgrade transportation or purchase a vehicle for the first time
through a Chapter 13 plan.

E. Recreation: Carefully Scrutinized by the Courts

The debtor's budgeted recreation expenditures are an expense category
that must pass the initial "necessity" threshold. Some bankruptcy courts
consider recreation a discretionary and unnecessary expenditure for a Chapter
13 debtor. These courts reason that recreation is an expenditure that can
easily be eliminated 171 and that the debtor's general unsecured creditors
should not be asked to contribute to the debtor's recreation habits. The
majority of courts, however, recognize that the debtor should be allowed some
recreational spending during a Chapter 13 plan.172 For example, one court

transportation other than an owned vehicle. The debtor's plan proposed a $150 per
month expenditure to purchase a vehicle and $78 per month for fuel, insurance and
maintenance. The plan proposed a 10% dividend to the general unsecured creditors.
170. Id. at 2. The court also stated the following:
A debtor's standard in life may frequently be enhanced under a Chapter 13
plan by virtue of the cessation of garnishments, executions and levies, not
to mention potential salary increases that creditors are not aware of.
However, to deliberately set up a plan that creates a luxury that the debtor
has not heretofore enjoyed while paying creditors a minimal sum hardly
seems in keeping with the spirit of the law. The Court does not believe
that debtors should be abused by their Chapter 13 plan, but neither does the
Court believe that creditors should be abused.
Id.
In another unpublished opinion, the same court denied discharge of a student loan
obligation of a debtor under the "undue hardship" standard of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)
(1988) of the Code in part because the debtor listed a budgeted expense of $270 per
month to purchase an automobile when the debtor did not own an automobile prior to
filing a Chapter 7 petition. In re Hayes, Case No. 90-20141-C (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1990). The court stated that "[i]t strikes the Court that she [the debtor] has and can
develop employment opportunities without a car and sufficient social development
without a car based on her past experience." Id. at 2.
171. One commentator categorized expenditures such as this as "discretionary

expenses." Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 70.
172. In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court stated that
"some recreation is justifiable and beneficial to family harmony and happiness." Id.
at 940 n.9.
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stated that a creditor's objection to a $12 per month recreation expenditure for
newspapers and periodicals was "not only spurious, it is downright heartless.""' Even these courts, however, scrutinize very carefully the budgeted
expenditures for recreation.' 74 An analysis of twenty-one cases'75 that
discussed budgeted recreation expenditures indicates that the average
expenditure proposed in the plans was six percent of the debtor's net income
or $112 per family member. The averages for plans that the courts refused to
confirm, however, were eight percent of net income and $124 per family
member compared to five percent and $46 for plans that were 'confirmed.
*Aproblem arises, however, as to what is an allowable minimal amount.
At a minimum, courts consistently refuse to confirm expenditures for
recreational assets such as boats or motor homes which they consider luxury
assets. For example, one court refused to confirm a plan that included a.$187
per month payment for a recreational boat.' 76 The court referred to the
"luxury goods and services" standard in section 523(a)(2)(C) of the Code as
one basis for its decision.177 Under that section, a bankruptcy court may
deny discharge of certain consumer debts inctirred to purchase "luxury goods
or services" that meet certain specific criteria. 17 The court concluded that
173. In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (footnote
omitted). The debtor's Chapter 13 plan proposed an 11% dividend for general
unsecured creditors which would have been raised to 12% by the elimination of the
newspaper expenditure. Id.
174. "Although some courts have disallowed recreational expenditures, the
determinative factor seems to be the extravagance of the expenditure rather than a
feeling that some recreation is not a basic need." Comment, ReligiousDebtor's,supra
note 29, at 886. One commentator stated that the courts examine a debtor's
discretionary expenses "with a close and often jaundiced eye." Corish & Herbert, supra
note 2, at 70.
175. See supra notes 170-71 and infra notes 176-194.

176. In re Hedges, 68 Bankr. 18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
177. Id. at 20.
178. The section reads in full:

(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts
owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500 for "luxury goods
or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or within forty days before
the order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than
$1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan
obtained by an individual debtor on or within twenty days before the order

for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; "luxury
goods or services" do not include goods or services reasonably acquired for
the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; an
extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to be defined

for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer Credit
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)....
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the boat was a luxury good, and that a luxury good not related to employment
was an unnecessary Chapter 13 recreation expenditure.179 The court stated
that "[a] fundamental purpose of the disposable income provision is to prevent
large expenditures by debtors for non-essential items which ultimately reduce
the sum available to pay holders of unsecured claims."18 Another court
held that a $598 per month payment to a secured creditor for a motor home
was unnecessary and a luxury recreational asset.181
The bankruptcy courts generally require a debtor to reduce or eliminate
recreation expenditures before they will confirm the debtor's Chapter 13 plan.
As noted above, the reductions are amounts that the courts deem to be
luxurious or unreasonable. It is difficult to determine what criteria or standard
the courts use in this determination because the results reached among the
various jurisdictions vary greatly."' One general observation from the cases
is that the courts evaluate recreation expenditures with reference to the
debtor's overall budget and to the amount the debtor proposes to pay to the
general unsecured creditors under the plan." 3 A plan proposing a very low
or nominal dividend to general unsecured creditors is less likely to have
recreation expenditures approved than a plan that proposes a substantial
dividend to the unsecured creditors. Also, some courts consider the debtor's

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (1988).
179. Hedges, 68 Bankr. at 20-21 ("The purpose of § 1325(b) would be ill-served
if the Court were to allow the debtor in the instant case to retain possession of purely
recreational property not reasonably necessary for maintenance or support of the debtor
or his dependents while his general unsecured creditors are to receive over an extended
period of time, less than half of the total amount of their claims.").
180. Id. at 20.
181. In re Struggs, 71 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987). The court noted
that the extra disposable income generated by not keeping the motor home would allow
the debtor to repay general unsecured creditors in full in 16 months. Id.
182. One commentator noted the following:
The courts have not been as uniform in their review of expenses for
recreation in general. One court held that $50 per month for a single man
was unreasonable. Yet another court described a single woman's $50 per
month expense for recreation as reasonable but went on to deny confirmation of the debtor's plan, holding that a large part of the debtor's sports car
payments (her second car) should be allocated to recreation. Yet another
court.held that $100 per month for recreation for a family of three was
unreasonable and $50 per month was reasonable (citations omitted).
Butler, supra note 10, at 413.
183. "The few courts who have encountered recreation as an expense in a budget
pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan have analyzed it by placing the debtor's overall lifestyle
and submitted budget into a reasonable and necessary framework." In re Sutliff, 79
Bankr. 151, 158 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
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marital status, the debtor's geographical area of residence, and the ages of any
dependents."' One cannot predict, however, if an unmarried debtor is more
likely to be allowed more recreation expenses than a married debtor, or if a
debtor with older dependents will be allowed more for recreation than a debtor
with young dependents. One court implied there may by a percentage ceiling
for recreation expenditures.' 85 The court stated that it could not confirm a
plan "with an entertainment allowance which represents a relatively large
chunk of the debtor's net monthly income and half of the proposed monthly
payment. 086

-Some proposed recreation' expenditures raise a red flag and are generally
187

disfavored. For example, budgeted expenditures for cable television,
dining out,ss country club dues189 and health club memberships'9' have

184. "The amount of recreation in each Chapter 13 budget is a fact question that
must be determined in the individual context of each debtor and his dependents." id
185. The court rejected the debtor's recreation budget as unreasonable and noted
that the "budget allocates more than six and one-half percent of his net monthly
income to recreation." Id.
186. Id. at 159.
187. Waites v. Braley, 110 Bankr. 211,215 (E.D. Va. 1990) (the debtor budgeted
$240 per month for recreation for a family of four and the amount included $36 for
cable television where the Trustee had argued that the cable television was unnecessary); See also In re Helmick, 117 Bankr. 187, 190 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (court
critical of unspecified expenditure for cable television); In re Ploegert, 93 Bankr. 641,
643 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (court regarded as excessive an $840 per month budget
for recreation for a single debtor that included $35 per month for cable television); In
re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (court concluded a $475 per
month budget for recreation for a family of four which included $25 per month for
cable television was excessive); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1984) ($65 per month for cable television regarded as not reasonably necessary).
But cf. In re Killough, 900 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1990) (the court affirmed a
bankruptcy court's determination that $27 per month for cable television was a
reasonable recreation expenditure).
188. Waites, 110 Bankr. at 216 (court criticized a debtor's budget of $204 for
recreation expenses for a family of four in part because it provided for eating out twice
a month); Ploegert,93 Bankr. at 643 (court considered an $840 per month recreation
budget which included "dining out on a weekly basis" for a single debtor to be
excessive); Bryant, 47 Bankr. at 26 ($100 per month for eating out for a family of four
considered excessive).
189. In re Chrzanowski, 70 Bankr. 447, 450 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987).

190. In re Kilson, 65 Bankr. 615, 622 (court considered unnecessary a proposed
expenditure of $48 per month for a health club membership as part of a budget of
$275 per month for recreation for a family of four). But cf In re Schyma, 68 Bankr.
52, 57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (the court allowed a $25 per month expenditure for
club dues for a family of seven).
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all been criticized by the courts as being either unnecessary or excessive
expenditures for a Chapter 13 debtor. Apart from these expenditures,
however, the courts allow at least some recreation expenditures in a Chapter
13 plan and will confirm plans with modest recreation expenditures.'"
Bankruptcy courts often discuss proposed expenditures for newspapers
and periodicals as a separate expense category, but they could be considered
a part of the debtor's recreation expenses.192 Generally, the courts allow
some expenditure for newspapers or periodicals.19 3 The courts usually,
however, require the debtor to specify which newspapers and periodicals are
being considered and to propose exact amounts for subscriptions. 9"

191. Examples of budgeted recreation expenditures that have been allowed as
reasonable by the courts include: In re Tefertiller, 104 Bankr. 513, 515 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1989) ($200 per month for a family of four); In re Stein, 91 Bankr. 786, 798
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ($50 per month for a family of five); In re Struggs, 71 Bankr.
96, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) ($50 per month for a single debtor); In re Peluso, 72
Bankr. 732, 733 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ($100 per month for a family of two); In re
Rogers, 65 Bankr. 1018, 1019 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) ($40 per month for a single
debtor); In re Walton, 69 Bankr. 150, 152 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986) ($40 per month for
a family of four); In re Schyma, 68 Bankr. 52, 57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) ($30 per
month for a family of seven).
For purposes of comparison, budgeted amounts for recreation expenditures which
have been criticized by the courts as unreasonable include: In re Helmick, 117 Bankr.
187, 190 (W.D. Pa. 1990) ($100 per month for a family of two); In re Reyes, 106
Bankr. 155, 158 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1989) ($120 per month for a single debtor); In re
Sutliff, 79 Bankr. 151, 156-57 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ($50 per month for a single
debtor); In re Davis, 68 Bankr. 205, 215-16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (the court stated
that it was arguable that an expenditure of $30 per month for a family of four was not
reasonably necessary); In re Kelly, 57 Bankr. 536, 538 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986) ($500
per month); In re Shands, 63 Bankr. 121, 123 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 19"85) ($120 per
month for a family of three); In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985)
($200 per month for a family of four when monthly income was $7,500).
192. "A reasonable amount for a local newspaper is also allowable as a basic
need." Comment, Religious Debtor's,supra note 29, at 886 (citations omitted).
193. "No humane standard would prohibit debtors in bankruptcy from buying a
newspaper." In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
194. Examples of amounts for newspapers and periodicals held by the courts to
be unreasonable expenditures for a Chapter 13 debtor include: Waites v. Braley, 110
Bankr. 211, 215 (E.D. Va. 1990) ($90 per month for a family of four); In re Ploegert,
93 Bankr. 641, 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) ($65 per month for a single debtor); In
re Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) ($30 per month for a family of
five. The court stated in footnote 1 that "a subscription to the local newspaper is $15
per calendar quarter, or approximately $4.60 per month. The remaining $23.40 of the
$30.00 per month listed by the Debtors is unaccounted for."); In re Kitson, 65 Bankr.
615, 622 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) ($24 per month for a family of four); In re Davis,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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The courts should be able to establish an objective standard for
determining reasonable recreation expenditures. For example, a standard of
three percent of net income could be used as a ceiling for recreation
expenditures. This amount would allow at least a modest amount for every
debtor and provide a presumption of reasonableness for any amount below
three percent. The courts could use their discretion in cases with compelling
circumstances.
F. Education:Absence of Case Law
A debtor's proposed Chapter 13 expenditures for private or parochial
school education present a dilemma for the bankruptcy courts. The critical
issue is whether a debtor should be able to budget for expensive private or
parochial school education when free public education is available. Expressed
another way, should general unsecured creditors be forced to subsidize an
expensive education for a debtor's dependents since funds that otherwise
would be paid to them are being used for education? This expense category
presents such a complex issue because it involves questions of public policy

and individual social values. The public policy issues relate to the quality of
public education in a particular area. The complexity is increased by the
potential impact on the debtor's dependents and the debtor's religious
convictions. Regarding the debtor's dependents, the question is whether the
debtor's financial woes should adversely affect the quality of a dependent's
education? In the parochial school context, the issue is one relating to
religious beliefs. If the debtor believes it is a religious duty to send his
children to a parochial school, should the court be able to limit or deny his or
her ability to do so? Creditors argue that private education is not a right of
citizenship. Therefore, it is not permissible to force them to contribute to
private or parochial education when the debtor's income, apart from Chapter
13 assistance, is not sufficient to provide for it.
Education is an expense category that some bankruptcy courts have
concluded is not a reasonably necessary expenditure for a Chapter 13 debtor.
Those courts hold that private or parochial education expenditures are never
reasonably necessary for support or maintenance of a debtor or his dependents.
Few courts, however, have addressed the issue of reasonably necessary

68 Bankr. 205, 215-16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) ($50 per month for a family of four
where the court stated that it is arguable that the expense is not reasonably necessary).
Examples of expenditures that the courts have held to be reasonable include: In
re Jones, 55 Bankr. 464 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) ($30 per month for a family of five);
Struggs, 71 Bankr. at 98 ($12 per month for a single debtor); Walton, 69 Bankr. at 152
($5 per month for a family of four); In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1984) ($25 per month for a family of four).
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educational expenses. One court held that $500 per month for tuition to a
private college and $500 per month for tuition to a parochial high school were
not necessary for support oi maintenance of the debtor's dependents.19 5 The
court stated that "an expensive private school education is not a basic need of
the Debtor's dependents, particularly in view of the high quality public
education available in this country at both the collegiate and secondary school
levels."'"
In spite of this language, the court proceeded to reduce the
Chapter 13 plan's total allowed expenses by only $377.54 per month. 9
Another court held that $395 for an "exclusive private high school" may not
be reasonably necessary. 98
Not all courts, however, have disallowed proposed Chapter 13 educational
expenditures. For example, one court held that $160 per month for college
tuition and $69 per month for a special school for a disabled daughter were
reasonably necessary.'" The court never stated whether the son attended
a public or private school, but it is likely that his $160 per month college
tuition was for a public college or university. Also, the $69 per month tuition
for a special school could be distinguished from other private school
expenditures bemuse it was required as a result of the dependent's disability.
Thus, it is possible that courts could consider public school tuition and
requiredprivate school tuition as necessary expenses. The rationale would be
that it is not reasonable to deny the debtor the opportunity to assist dependents
with educational expenses so long as the expenditures are not for discretionary
private school expenses. At least one court, however, has held that $100 per
month for a parochial school was reasonably necessary. 200 The court
reasoned that the parochial school tuition was not a luxury expenditure and the
debtor "[o]btained no tangible
benefit or increased standard of living because
20 1
of the money expended.,
Due to the lack of cases discussing this expense category, it is almost
impossible to reach a conclusion regarding allowable education expenditures.
Probably, public school tuition and required private school tuition have a
greater chance of being allowed by the courts in a Chapter 13 plan than
private or parochial school tuition expended for purely personal reasons.
There are arguable policy reasons for denying private school tuition because

195. Jones, 55 Bankr. at 467.

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. In re Gyurci, 95 Bankr. 639, 643 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989).
199. In re Hudson, 64 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
200. In re Navarro, 83 Bankr. 348, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ("I am not
prepared to conclude that tithing and religious education are per se unreasonable
choices for the maintenance and support of a chapter 13 debtor's family.").
201. Id.
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of available public education. Also, the reduced cost for public education
would leave more of the debtor's funds available to repay general unsecured
creditors. The parochial school issue is more complex because of the religious
convictions of the debtor. The problems attendant with denying exercise of
religious convictions during a Chapter 13 plan are discussed infra in Section
II. H. of this Comment in connection with a discussion of the religious
contribution expense category.
G. Contingency Fund: Minimal Amounts Allowed
Most debtors include in their proposed Chapter 13 plan an amount
commonly referred to as a "contingency fund." The idea is that a debtor
should have an amount budgeted for unspecified expenditures that may arise
during the course of the plan. The expenditures may be for unanticipated
emergencies or for items that do not fit other expense categories. As a result,
the contingency fund can be thought of as a "miscellaneous" expense category.
The fund is the expense category most scrutinized by the courts since it
represents a non-specified fund 20 2 and most courts question either the
necessity for the fund or the reasonableness of the amount proposed.
Creditors argue that this contingency amount should not be included in the
debtor's budget as a reasonably necessary expense. The problem, however,
is that "personal expenses do not arrive in monthly lumps." 20 3 Without at

least some cushion for unexpected expenses, the debtor may not be able to
complete the plan as proposed.
Some courts hold that a contingency fund is not a reasonably necessary
expense in a Chapter 13 plan because section 1329 of the Code allows
modification of a plan by either a debtor or a creditor after confirmation if the
debtor's circumstances change. Other courts have held, however, that using
section 1329 to modify a plan each time an unforeseen expense arises would
be a waste of judicial time and resources. For example, one court stated that
to reject a contingency fund and rely on modification would "cause additional
time and expense to the debtor, his counsel and the trustee in constantly
amending the plan to reflect the changes to the debtor's regular income and
expenses, not to mention burdening the court's calendar." 2' One commentator suggested that not allowing the Chapter 13 debtor a contingency fund for
emergencies would be a violation of the feasibility test of section 1325(a)(6)
because it is unlikely that the debtor would be able to complete the plan

202. One commentator referred to the contingency fund as an "area of controversy" in the reasonably-necessary-expenses determination for the disposable income test.
Butler, supra note 10, at 413.
203. Gross, supra note 24, at 69.
204. In re Belt, 106 Bankr. 553, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
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without it. 2°5 Another commentator has suggested that "to the extent that
the court is concerned about the retention of excessive contingency reserves,
it could require the debtor' to account for any unspent and uncommitted
reserves at the end of the plan, and to make a final dividend to creditors of
whatever excess remained." 2°6
Bankruptcy courts are evenly split as to whether a contingency fund is
a reasonably necessary expense. The courts that have addressed the issue
recognize that "the Code requires a meaningful and realistic budget accompanied by devotion of most of the debtor's surplus income to repay creditors."2 7 Despite the desire to maximize the dividend of general unsecured
creditors, some courts conclude that an amount budgeted for contingencies is
For example, in
a reasonable expense category for a Chapter 13 plan.2'
In re Otero,2" the court held that $117 per month for contingencies was an
acceptable amount. 21° The court stated that "a cushion of money is necessary in Chapter 13 budgeting to guard against life's unexpectancies. It is not
in the public interest to squeeze the last dollar from Chapter 13 debtors to
fund a Chapter 13 plan." 211 In another case, a California court allowed as
reasonable a proposed contingency fund of $75 per month for a family of
four.212 The court reasoned that the contingency reserve was necessary

205. Butler, supra note 10, at 413. See also In re Coffman, 90 Bankr. 878, 884
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988) ("there is ample authority for the proposition that in order
to meet the feasibility requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan should provide for
a 'cushion' of money 'to guard against life's expectancies [sic]"'); Collier, supra note
19, at para. 1325.08 (citations omitted) ("Many courts, in considering whether a plan
is feasible under section 1325(a)(6) of the Code, have noted that a realistic budget
must include some margin for such expenses.") (citations omitted).
206. Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 69.
207. In re Belt, 106 Bankr. 553, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
208. In a reference to Section 1325(b) of the Code, one court stated that "a
reasonable reserve or contingency fund does not violate that section." Id. See also In
re Fries, 68 Bankr. 679, 683 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
One commentator concluded that "the majority of cases, however, have allowed
the debtor to retain a monthly surplus of various amounts, apparently holding that such
a surplus is a reasonable and necessary expense and as such is not part of the debtor's
projected disposable income". Butler, supra note 10, at 413 (citations omitted). See
also Collier, supra note 19, at para. 1325.08 ("It is also clear from the legislative
history that the amount necessary for support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents
must include a 'cushion' for unexpected expenses.").
209. 48 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
210. Id. at 708.
211. Id.
212. In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 552-53 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). See also Fries,
68 Bankr. at 683 n.7 ($92.16 per month for a family of five).
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because "while improvident spending doubtless accounts for a certain portion
of post-petition defaults, it appears that most of the relief from stay litigation
results 13from debtors' simple inability to live within their proposed budgets.

,,2

On the other hand, some courts take the position that a contingency
reserve is not a reasonably necessary expense and will not allow any amount
for it. For example, one court refused to allow a debtor to retain $35 per
month for contingencies. 214 The debtor's plan proposed to pay unsecured
creditors approximately twenty percent and proposed to commit $450 out of
$485 of disposable income.215 The court interpreted "all" in section 1325(b)
to mean that the debtor's entire income net of reasonable expenses must go
toward the plan.21 6 Another court held that $40 per month for contingencies
for a single debtor was not reasonably necessary.2" 7
Even courts that allow the contingency fund will carefully evaluate if the
proposed amount of the fund is reasonable. 2'8 For example, one court stated
that $376 per month for contingencies for a family of four was excessive.219

The court did not conclude that the budgeted contingency category was
unnecessary. Rather, the court criticized the amount as being excessive. In
In re Marshall,220 the court implied that a debtor would need to prove the
necessity of a contingency fund to include it in the Chapter 13 plan. The
debtor proposed to include $469 per month in his Chapter 13 plan as a "safety
cushion" against "fluctuation" of his income. 221 This amount represented
thirty-three percent of his disposable income and fourteen percent of his net
income. 222 The court stated that it must assume the proposed income will
be available "unless the Debtors can make a firm showing that a cushion for

213. Greer, 60 Bankr. at 553. The court noted that "debtors in general have been
cutting their budgets too thinly to be able to meet their post-petition obligations,
including plan payments." Id. Also, the court stated that the feasibility test of section
1325(a)(6) would mandate a contingency fund to make sure the debtor could make all

payments due under the plan. Id.
214. In re Krull, 54 Bankr. 375, 377 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
215. Id.
216. Id. Thus, the court was implying that disposable income did not include a
contingency fund for unexpected future expenses.
217. In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 158 (Bankr. N.D. II1.1989).
218. "Even if a surplus is allowed, the amount of the surplus is subject to judicial
review for reasonableness just like any other expense." Butler, supra note 10, at 41314.
219. In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 621 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986). It should be
noted, however, that the debtor had also budgeted $433 for miscellaneous expenses.
220. 111 Bankr. 325 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
221. Id. at 327.
222. Id.
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unexpected necessities is reasonably probable.""m Thus, the court inferred
that a contingency fund can be proposed to cover reasonably probable
fluctuations in income, but the court stated that $469 per month was "patently
more than a safety cushion."' 4
Bankruptcy courts sometimes discuss whether a debtor should be allowed
to maintain a savings or pension plan or deduction during a Chapter 13 plan.
These discussions relate to the concept of a contingency fund because the
savings plans can serve the same function as a contingency fund. One
commentator stated that "the real issue is whether the money saved is likely
to be needed by the debtor during the three year period or not. Obviously, a
debtor should not be allowed to save for retirement, or even a mardi gras
ending to his penitential three years." 225 One court distinguished between
mandatory and voluntary savings accounts. 2 6 The court noted that a $30.40
per month payroll deduction for a savings account was "compulsory and a
condition for [the debtot's] continued employment. 0227 Therefore, the court
concluded that "this compulsory monthly payroll deduction is not 'disposable
income' because it is akin to an expense necessarily expended if [the debtor]
is going to continue to be engaged in her normal business venture of being a
teacher. , 22m
The few courts that have discussed savings plans have rejected them as
an unnecessary expenditure in a Chapter 13 plan. 229 For example, in In re
Festner,230 the court held that $25 per month for voluntary retirement
benefits and $22 per month for a stock savings plan were not reasonably
necessary for the debtor's or his dependent's support or maintenance."m The
court stated that "[a]dditional pension plans and stock purchases may be a
wise investment which enhance an individual's financial security, but the

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

IL
Md
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 69.
In re Colon Vazquez, 111 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1990).
Id. at 20.
228. Id. The court concluded that "the deduction fulfills a public policy
enunciated by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which this
Bankruptcy Court will respect and uphold." Id.
229. One commentator stated that "several courts have determined that saving for
the future is not a present basic need." Comment, Religious Debtor's,supra note 29,

at 885 (citations omitted).
230. 54 Bankr. 532 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
231. Id. at 533. The plan also included an $85 per month payment on a loan
secured by stock owned by the debtor. Id. The court concluded that the payout to
unsecured creditors would increase from 42% to 82% if all three payments were added
to disposable income.
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debtor is not entitled to acquire them at the expense of unpaid creditors., 232
Another court held that a $12.50 per week deduction for a debtor's savings
account was not a reasonably necessary expense.2 3 Further, in In re
Bel' the court held that a voluntary annuity contribution of $820 per
month was not a reasonably necessary expenditure.23 5 The court stated that
"[t]he debtor is apparently saving for his future at the expense of his present
creditors; this is simply not reasonably necessary for his support and cannot
be condoned."2' 6 These cases imply that it is important how a debtor
characterizes a proposed amount for emergencies in his Chapter 13 plan. A
proposed category for contingency fund may have a better chance of being

allowed than a proposal to maintain a savings account deduction.
H. Charitable& Religious Giving: A Split Among the Courts
A complex issue facing bankruptcy courts is whether they can refuse to
confirm a plan in which a debtor proposes to contribute monthly to a chosen
religious organization.3 7 The issue generally arises in the context of
"tithing "23s to a religious organization."

One concern is if it would be

232. Id.
233. In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986). It is significant
to note that 94% of the debtor's unsecured debt was a personal injury judgment from
an auto accident and the debtor was proposing to pay only 14% on his unsecured
debts. Id. at 114.
234. 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
235. Id. at 642. See also In re Chrzanowski, 70 Bankr. 447, 448 (Bankr. D. Del.
1987) (the court criticized a $202.75 proposed monthly expenditure which included an
amount for a voluntary IRA deduction).
236. Id.
237. One court stated the following:
By whatever name or rite, man has and will seek some entity or institution
that answers the unanswerable questions and assuages the unassuageable
doubts and concerns of our human existence. But that is each person's free
choice; to seek or not, to believe or not; to contribute or not; and who or
what is right is not for this Court or any other branch of the state or federal
government to decide. This Court may not and must not say what if any
portion of debtor's income shall go to support his personal religious beliefs,
but this Court may determine what constitutes those items reasonably
necessary 'to be expended-(A) for the maintenance or support of a debtor
or a dependent.'
In re Reynolds, 83 Bankr. 684, 685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
238. One commentator defined religious tithing as "the giving of a tenth of the
annual produce or other income for the support of a particular religious ministry."

Comment, Resolving the ConflictBetween Chapter13 ofthe Bankruptcy Code and the
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a constitutional violation to deny a debtor the opportunity to contribute to a
religious organization under a Chapter 13 plan. The constitutional arguments
are based on the Free Egercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 ° The debtors argue that if
the court refuses to allow an expenditure for religious giving in a Chapter 13
plan, then the court has interfered with the debtor's right to the free exercise
of religion." I Conversely, the creditors argue that if the court allows a
debtor to contribute to a religious organization as a reasonably necessary
expenditure under a Chapter 13 plan, then the court is forcing the general
unsecured creditors to contribute to the debtor's religious organization, thereby
violating the Establishment Clause.242 Most bankruptcy courts that have
addressed the issue of proposed expenditures for tithing have concluded there
is no constitutional issue involved.243 Instead, they maintain that the
determination of whether religious giving under a Chapter 13 plan is a
reasonably necessary expense is no different from the determination for any
other expenditure category.

FreeExercise Clause-In Re Green: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 57 Miss. L.J.
163, 164 n.8 (1987) (quoting Homer, The Christian and The Tithe, RESOURCE
UNLImrrED 176, 178 (W. Hendrick's ed. 1972)).
239. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional and other issues related to
giving to a religious organization as a part of a Chapter 13 plan, see Comment, supra
note 238, at 164; Comment, Religious Debtor's,supra note 29.
240. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in relevant
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
241. "The debtors argue that their right to tithe is protected by the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment and that forcing them to choose between tithing and
proposing a confirmable bankruptcy plan by application of the disposable income test
would deprive them of constitutionally protected substantive rights." In re Navarro,
83 Bankr. 348, 351 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
A few courts have agreed that the debtor's right to tithe during the pendency of
a Chapter 13 plan is protected by the Establishment Clause. See In re Green, 103
Bankr. 852 (Bankr. W.D: Mich. 1988).
242. "[IThe creditor implicitly argues that by allowing the debtor to contribute
funds to a church which could otherwise be used to pay unsecured creditors, the court
is indirectly compelling the creditor to support religious endeavors in violation of the
establishment clause and right to freedom of association found in the First Amendment." Navarro, 83 Bankr. at 352. See also In re Tucker, 102 Bankr. 219, 220
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1989) ("By allowing a chapter 13 debtor to deduct contributions to any
organization, the Court necessarily is forcing the debtor's creditors to contribute to the
debtor's church or favorite charity. Congress could have intended no such result.").
243. For example, one court stated that it could "either confirm or refuse to
confim the debtor's plan without violating the constitution." Navarro, 83 Bankr. at
354.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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Two courts have reasoned that some tithing should be allowed as a
reasonable expenditure in a Chapter 13 plan because Official Form 10, item
4(b)(15), authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 9009, provides a space to list
"religious and other charitable contributions" in the debtor's budget.244 The

Official Forms were not approved by Congress nor by the Rules Committee,
however, and, therefore do not provide any indication of legislative intent. 45
A majority of the courts that have considered the issue hold that
charitable or religious giving is not a reasonably necessary expense for the

support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor in a Chapter 13 plan.2'
One commentator stated that "if charity begins at home, it ends with
bankruptcy.2 47 In In re Sturgeon,248 the court held that tithing of $140
per month was not a necessary expense. 249 Another court held that giving
$103 per month to the church was not reasonably necessary250 Perhaps the
most extreme example of this position on charitable giving is the court that
refused to confirm a plan that proposed a $7 per month payroll deduction for
the United Way."

244. In re Curry, 77 Bankr. 969, 970 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987). See also Navarro,
83 Bankr. at 356.
245. Curry, 77 Bankr. at 970.
246. See In re Reynolds, 83 Bankr. 684, 685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). One
commentator stated that "charitable contributions of even very modest amounts have
been forbidden." Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 74 (citations omitted).
247. Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 74.
248. 51 Bankr. 82 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985).
249. Id. at 83.
250. In re Curry, 77 Bankr. 969, 969-70 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989). In that case,
the debtor proposed a $125 per month payment to his Chapter 13 plan which would
have amounted to a 26% dividend for the unsecured creditors. Id. at 969. The court
noted that the contribution was "voluntary" and stated that to allow the expense would
"permit the debtor to require that his creditorscontribute to his chosen charity." Id. at
970 (court's emphasis).
251. In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986). See also In re
Gyurci, 95 Bankr. 639, 643 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (the court stated that the debtor
could tighten his belt by eliminating a $100 per month contribution to his church); In
re Tucker, 102 Bankr. 219, 220 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1989) (the court held that a tithe of
$100 per month was not a reasonably necessary expense for a chapter 13 plan); In re
Davis, 68 Bankr. 205, 215-216 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (the court stated that itis
arguable that a church contribution of $46 per month is not a reasonably necessary
expense); In re Hudsbn, 64 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) ("this Court does
not favor, during the course of its Chapter 13 cases, the contribution of funds to nonprofit institutions for the main reason that these contributions are not included in the
provisions of Section 1325, particularly Section 1325(b)(1) and (2)."). Id. at 75 n.1.
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A few bankruptcy courts have held, however, that a small amount of
giving under a Chapter 13 plan is a reasonably necessary expenditure. For
example, one court stated that "some level of religious or charitable contribution and some expenditure on religious education may be consistent with
expenditures reasonably necessary for maintenance and support of chapter 13
debtors." 2 In the Western District of Missouri, Judge Koger held that
"certainly some nominal amount will be permissible, but that amount will need
to be below 3% of gross income unless very unusual circumstances are
present."253 Another court held that $17 per month for a family of four was
a reasonably necessary expenditure.2 4 These courts treat religious or
charitable giving the same as any other necessary expense category. They
presume that tithing or charitable giving is not a luxury expense that increases
the debtor's standard of living, but rather is similar to any other expense
considered in the disposable income analysis.' 5
Some bankruptcy courts make a distinction between required giving and
voluntary giving. 6 One court concluded that the critical factors in
analyzing proposed tithing are whether the tithe is mandatory and whether it
serves a bona fide religious purpose. z " The court stated:
252. In re Navarro, 83 Bankr. 348, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
253. In re Reynolds, 83 Bankr. 684, 685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). The court
stated that "this Court chooses to establish no hard and fast rule as to what amount or
percentage of charitable contribution it will construe as 'reasonably necessary.' That
will depend on the circumstances of each case." Id. However, the court then held that
contributions should not exceed 3% of gross income except in very unusual
circumstances. Id.
254. In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
255. Navarro,83 Bankr. at 356. The court concluded that "religious contributions
and parochial school education are not expenses for luxury goods or services. The
debtors obtain no tangible benefit or increased standard of living because of the money
expended." Id.
256. In re Sturgeon, 51 Bankr. 82, 83 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985) ("the Court does
not believe that there is any church law requiring this donation; it is more a matter of
conscience.") Thus, the court held open the possibility that tithing to the church may
be a reasonably necessary expense if the particular denomination "required" it. In the
case before it, however, the objecting creditor was the estate of a driver killed by the
debtor's drunk driving, and the court stated that "under the circumstances presented
here it would be more just and more noble a gesture to offer the $140.00 per month
to the Estate of Christopher Helmsing." Id. at 83-84. Thus, the holding in that case
may be specific to the facts of the case.
257. In re Bien, 95 Bankr. 281, 282 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989). The court stated
that:
An expense for a religious tithe must be treated differently. Court scrutiny
of such expense should include a determination of whether the proposed
expense fulfills a bona fide personal commitment intended to serve or
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The church tithe is a condition precedent to full participation in the debtor's
religion, and the proposal to incur that expense unquestionably serves a
bona fide religious and spiritual purpose ....
Since the amount is an
integral part of the religion rather than a discretionary
donation, it is, as
2
noted, beyond the purview of this court's inquiry.
Another court stated that "in the context of a sincerely held belief in a
denomination that mandates a tithe, I cannot hold that contribution of a tithe
is excessive." 25
It seems, however, that if a court seeks to avoid a
discretionary decision of whether a tithe is reasonably necessary by holding
that it is reasonable if mandatory, then the court will nevertheless be caught
up in a fact intensive discretionary determination of whether a particular tithe

is voluntary or mandatory.
Some bankruptcy courts consider the size of the Chapter 13 plan's
dividend to general unsecured creditors. In In re Miles,2O the court stated
that the issue to be decided in the case was "whether the Court over the
objection of the trustee can confirm a plan which pays only a minimal
dividend to unsecured creditors while the debtors continue to devote a
substantial amount of their income to support of their church."" 1 After

promote some religious or spiritual purpose, rather than an effort to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors, and whether there is a nondiscretionary
obligation to pay such expense in a specific amount. Where, as here, the
obligation is nondiscretionary, the amount of such expense is not a proper
subject for court scrutiny. Therefore, the sole issue here is whether the
debtor's proposed tithe is intended to serve an appropriate purpose. I
conclude that it is.
Id. (citations omitted).
258. Id. at 283.
259. Navarro,83 Bankr. at 357. See also In re Gaukler, 63 Bankr. 224 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1986). In Gaukler, debtors with a net monthly income of $1802.56 and four
young children had a $672 expenditure for religious giving. Id. at 225. The court
noted that the debtors had already sold their home and moved into an apartment and
had given back their automobile to the secured creditor. Id. Because of extreme steps
to tighten the belt, the court concluded that "the Debtors are not typical of most
individuals who find their way into financially destitute circumstances." Id. at 226.
The court stated that "it seems a quite stern and uncaring religion that would require
faithful adherence to such a level of giving when the persons being asked to give are
jeopardizing the welfare of their family in the course of compliance." Id. The court
held, however, that the expenditure was not unreasonable because it was a sincerely
held belief and the giving was required by the church. Id.
260. 96 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989).
261. Id. at 349. The debtors net monthly income was $1,145 and they proposed
to pay a 2% dividend to general unsecured creditors in their plan. Id. The proposed
monthly expense for tithing was $160 while their monthly payment to the plan was
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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noting the different approaches taken by courts in analyzing on the issue, the
Miles court held that "while church donations may be a source of inner
strength and comfort to those who feel compelled to make them, they are not
necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor and accordingly these debtors failed to meet the disposable income test
required for confirmation of their plan."2" The court rejected the constitutional argument that a court must allow tithing during a Chapter 13 plan and
decided that tithing was not a reasonably necessary expense. 63
III. ANALYSIS
The courts have yet to develop a standard test to determine reasonably
necessary expenses under the disposable income test of section 1325(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.2 " In fact, the principal problem with the disposable
incorfie test in general and the reasonably necessary expense determination in
particular is that no uniformity exists.25 It is not equitable that some
debtors can propose more modest Chapter 13 plans strictly because of the
jurisdiction in which they happen to live. Uniformity, however, does not
mean that there is a formula or standard that can be applied in every situation.
The fact that Congress used a "reasonably necessary" standard is an indication
that any disposable income analysis will require some case-by-case scrutiny
by the courts. Because the disposable income requirement is a very recent
addition to the realm of bankruptcy jurisprudence, it has takeii a few years for
the courts to develop the issues and preliminary approaches to resolve those
issues. Perhaps it is time to gather the experience gained from those early
cases and develop an approach that will achieve at least three objectives: (1)
maximum repayment to the unsecured creditors,26 (2) uniformity and

$50.60 for 36 months. Id.
262. Id. at 350..
263. Id.
264. One court observed that "a bright line rule of what is reasonably necessary
has not been established by the courts." In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 157 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989).
265. "Congress has created a test that is so flexible in a judge's hands that it is
impossible to expect any large degree of consistency between the bankruptcy courts."
Comment, Zero Payment, supra note 20, at 475.

266. One court stated that "[t]he purpose of Chapter 13 is to reward the debtor
who undertakes to repay his unsecured creditors with more lenient treatment than
accorded a liquidation Chapter 7 debtor. (Citation omitted) '[T]he special benefits
bestowed upon a Chapter 13 debtor are premised upon his willingness to repay at least
some portion of his debts... ."' In re Strause, 101 Bankr. 223, 224 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1989) (citation omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/3
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predictability2 7 among the various bankruptcy jurisdictions, and (3) rehabilitation za assistance for the debtor.
A. Issues That Affect the ReasonablenessDetermination
Several issues arise in the context of determining reasonably necessary
expenditures under a Chapter 13 plan that affect the approach a court uses to
analyze the expenditures. Any proposed method to analyze a debtor's
proposed expenditures under a Chapter 13 plan must account for these issues.
First, the threshold issue is whether a bankruptcy court should have discretion
to make value judgments regarding the debtor's proposed Chapter 13
lifestyle. 9 One commentator remarked that if a court is allowed to evaluate

Another court criticized a Chapter 13 plan because "they have not reduced their

standard of living to maximize the plan's distribution." In re Hale, 65 Bankr. 893, 897
(Bankr. S.E. Ga. 1988).
267. "By adding Section 1325(b)'s disposable income test, Congress intended to
eliminate inconsistent judicial interpretations concerning the degree of debt that a
debtor must repay to have his Chapter 13 plan confirmed." Comment, Disposable
Income, supra note 55, at 221 (citing S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 21
(1983). "Congress hoped to create a concrete standard which would both eliminate the
disparity between the judicial districts and be consistent with the basic consumer credit
theory of extending credit based on future income." Id. at 225. One court implied as
follows that uniformity is a purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988):
Section 1325(b) can be viewed only as a floor below which no plan can go
and still be confirmed, even if the general good faith test is fully met to the
satisfaction of the Bankruptcy Judge. It is a 'fail-safe' mechanism to insure
some uniformity in the minimum effort that will be required of debtors,
even when their good faith is not questioned.
Hale, 65 Bankr. at 896
It can be argued, however, that uniformity and predictability are not Congressional policy objectives for bankruptcy. For example, although Congress adopted federal
standards for exempt property in 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988) of the Code, a state is
allowed to establish its own exempt property guidelines and opt-out of the federal
exemption. Because states are allowed to opt-out, a wide discrepancy has developed
among the states regarding the amount of property a debtor may exempt from the
estate. For example, some states allow a debtor to exempt his entire homestead while
other states place rather low limits on the amount allowed for a homestead exemption.
These varied standards in regard to exempt property resulted from Congress' decision
to allow states to opt-out and apply their own standards. Thus, this situation supports
the position that uniformity and predictability are not congressional goals of
bankruptcy relief.
268. One court stated that "the spirit and purpose of Chapter 13 is rehabilitation
through repayment of debt." Hale, 65 Bankr. at 894.
269. One commentator phrased the question as follows: "[alt what point does the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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the debtor's lifestyle in its determination of the reasonableness of the debtor's
Chapter 13 exlenditures, it "opens up a Pandora's Box of subjective and
speculative value judgments of unparalleled intrusiveness." 270 Although
some commentators oppose bankruptcy courts making judgments concerning
a debtor's proposed Chapter 13 lifestyle, 271 bankruptcy courts must make
those determinations because section 1325(b) requires2 72 the court to make
certain that all the debtor's disposable income is available for the Chapter 13
plan. Also, the courts are called upon to make the same or similar value
judgments and reasonableness determinations under other sections of the
Code. 273
Assuming bankruptcy courts should,274 and consistently do, make
lifestyle determinations regarding a Chapter 13 debtor's proposed expenses,
a second issue is if debtors should be allowed to maintain their prebankruptcy
lifestyle. One commentator maintained that "[tihe court should not permit a

court's review of the minutiae of a debtor's financial life become an unwarranted
intrusion into personal autonomy?" Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 82. Another
commentator stated that "one is forced to ask whether a court in its effort to benefit
creditors, should be empowered to dictate how a debtor ought to live." Morris, supra

note 9, at 123.
270. Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 352.
271. For example, one commentator remarked "'need' is hardly an objective
concept and the notion that a third party will decide a family's needs is offensive to
a widespread belief that such decisions be left to individuals." Id. at 353. Another
commentator stated that "[a]lthough many individuals are in need of counselling so that
they can better handle their expenses, a court should not attempt to perform this
function, a task that extends well beyond its duties as an adjudicator." Gross, supra
note 24, at 135.
One court stated as follows:
Whether a family of five should spend $100 per month ($25 per week) on
recreation instead of paying creditors is a matter of judgment ....
Likewise, it may be questioned whether church contributions of $100 a
month should come ahead of repayment to creditors. Having a fourth child
may be a questionable luxury. At what point such inquiries and decisions
by a bankruptcy court would become an affront to society's sensibilities or
the U.S. Constitution remains uncertain.
In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 940 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
272. "[T]he statute [section 1325(b)] apparently requires the court to be the arbiter
and architect of the defendant's [debtor's] lifestyle." Breilowitz, supra note 3, at 351.
273. For a good discussion of other Code provisions that require a court to
determine reasonably necessary expenses, see In re Kitson, 65 Bankr. 615, 619 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1986); Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 56.
274. "A determination of the reasonableness of a debtor's expenses requires the
Court to make a value judgment." In re Ashton, 85 Bankr. 766, 770 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1988).
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debtor to maintain the extravagant lifestyle which may have led to the need
for bankruptcy relief in the first place." 275 All bankruptcy courts hold that
debtors should not be able to continue expenditures for luxuries during a
Chapter 13 plan. 76 A few commentators argue that requiring debtors to
reduce their pre-bankruptcy lifestyle would, contrary to congressional
objectives, result in fewer Chapter 13 bankruptcies.277 The trend among the
courts is to examine the debtors' proposed expenditures on their own merits,
rather than to compare them to the debtors' pre-bankruptcy lifestyle.27 8 The
courts disfavor allowing debtors to upgrade their living expenditures under a

275. Morris, supra note 9, at 158.
276. One court stated in reference to a debtor who sought to retain a Rolex watch
in his Chapter 13 plan as follows:
If a debtor cannot pay his bills as they become due, and seeks the
protection of the bankruptcy court, he is not required to forego all physical
and social pleasures. Neither is he to don sackcloth and ashes and proclaim
his misfortune to the world as past day leprs were required to do.
Nevertheless he is constrained to live somewhat more modestly than to the
style that led to his fall from financial grace. It does not take a multithousand dollar device to discern the precise moment of the day or night a comparable result can be obtained by a much less expensive means.
In re Holcomb, Case No. 88-00535-W-13 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (Unpublished
opinion of Koger, J.).
277. For example, one commentator stated as follows:
Obviously, those high income debtors would be discouraged from filing
chapter 13 if they were forced to trim their lifestyles too severely. If
BAFJA were interpreted in a way that led to fewer reorganizations, rather
than more, its purposes presumably would be frustrated. Of course, this
problem could be alleviated by the vigorous use of Section 707(b) to force
reorganization. Thus, if the courts do in time adopt a more stringent
definition of permissible lifestyle expenses, they will also have to monitor
petitions more closely for signs of substantial abuse.
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 74.
The same commentator noted that "at least one early study of the disposable
income standard expressed concern that, by increasing the cost of a Chapter 13
discharge, Congress had discouraged consumer Chapter 13 proceedings." Id. at 78
(citation omitted). The commentator went on to note, however, that "[a]lthough the
available statistics are rather spotty, this does not appear to be the case. Chapter 13
proceedings appear to be about as popular now as they were before BAFJA." Id.
278. One commentator stated in reference to another Code section that requires
a determination of reasonably necessary expenses that "[c]ourts which have considered
the debtor's reasonable needs for the purposes of section 522(d) generally have
suggested that the debtor's prebankruptcy lifestyle does not limit the court's
postbankruptcy determination of reasonableness." Morris, supra note 9, at 157-58
(citations omitted).
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Chapter 13 plan; but most bankruptcy courts would not take the position that
debtors may never add to a Chapter 13 plan any expense that the debtors were

not expending pre-bankruptcy.
A third issue is the criteria that a bankruptcy court uses to evaluate the
proposed expenditures in a Chapter 13 plan. The courts must evaluate the
expenditures according to some standards. Should the courts compare the
debtor's proposed expenditures to those of other debtors or to some average
amounts for the area? Should the standards be objective? Commentators
have debated whether bankruptcy courts should use objective standards to
reduce a Chapter 13 debtor's expenditures to uniform levels.279 Neither the
Code nor the legislative history of section 1325(b) establishes any objective
Currently, there is no indication in the case law that any
standards.m
bankruptcy jurisdiction is using objective criteria as a measuring stick to
determine reasonably necessary expenses." 1 The courts and most commen-

279. For example, one commentator stated that "courts should not be in the
business of equalizing all debtors to the same social standard on the basis of the
court's own predilections of how people in financial trouble ought to live." Gross,
supra note 24, at 132. The same commentator reasoned that:
If courts do not intervene with respect to a debtor's expenditures, creditors
will be forced to make a more careful evaluation of the risks of lending to
a particular individual. Rather than making the court a collection agency,
creditors ought to do a better job of evaluating credit risks, with the
consequence of an error in that process falling on the creditors rather than
the debtor. This shift in risk allocation makes sense from an economic
perspective. Creditors are in the best position to judge the ability of an
individual to repay.
Id. at 134.
Another commentator stated, however, that "the problem created by permitting
Chapter 13 debtors to enjoy very different lifestyles based on their social and economic
status should at least be addressed by the courts." Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at
74. The same commentator asked "to what extent is it fair to permit a high-income
debtor to retain an approximately upper-middle class lifestyle," and then stated that the
problem "could have been alleviated by the imposition of a more objective standard."
Id. at 82.
280. "Congress gave no indication of what types of expenses were reasonably
necessary. Congress set up a standard which vests large discretion in judges and then
provided no guidelines to assist in creating uniformity." Comment, Zero Payment,
supra note 20, at 463-64.
281. "The courts have generally followed an unobjectionable commonsensical
approach to lifestyle expenses, neither requiring asceticism nor condoning hedonism."
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 71. "The disposable income cases have permitted
the debtor to continue something resembling his prior lifestyle. The debtor has not
been forced to live in bankruptcy poverty, or anywhere near bankruptcy poverty, unless
he was already poor." Id. at 73 (citations omitted). "While the 'collection' oriented
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tators maintain that a case-by-case analysis of proposed Chapter 13 expendi-

tures is the method intended by Congress and a logical requirement for a
reasonably necessary test. 82 State garnishment laws, however, are an
example of objective criteria applied to an overextended debtor. Under state
garnishment laws, only a certain percentage of a debtor's wages is available
for attachment by judgment creditors.8 3 Thus, there is precedent for

courts are capable of harsh rhetoric, the bottom-line differences between acceptable and
unacceptable plans are relatively modest." Id. at 80. "In part the popularity of Chapter
13 is due to the wide discretion which the courts have exercised in applying the
standard [§ 1325(b)]; despite protestations to the contrary, this discretion has generally
been exercised in favor of permitting the debtor to maintain some semblance of his
prior lifestyle. Id. at 82.
282. The premise of these advocates is that by using the "reasonably necessary"
standard, Congress intended to give no guidance and to leave the determination up to
the courts. In other words, determining "reasonableness" requires discretion. One
commentator stated that:
Each case should be handled by application of a flexible standard that
recognizes the debtor's freedom to determine at least the contours of how
she lives while according the court some discretion in balancing that
freedom with the rights of creditors to be repaid. Applying a uniform
standard of how debtors should live, whether based on a court's subjective
assessment or a fixed federal standard creates, in essence, a class of
bankruptcy poor. A case-by-case approach frees both the debtor and the
court by permitting the court to blend both an objective and subjective
component into its decisionmaking process.
Gross, supra note 24, at 133.
283. For example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri
noted that "Missouri state law effectively exempts from garnishment all but 25% of
an individual's earnings and all but 10% of those earnings if the individual is the head
of a family and is a resident of Missouri." In re Antal, 85 Bankr. 838, 840 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1988) (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 525.030(2) (1986)).
One commentator discussed garnishment laws as follows:
For example, in determining what portion of a debtor's wages should be
garnished, state courts have looked at what amount a debtor needs to
support herself and her family and in some instances have precluded
garnishment of these amounts. Recognizing the difficulties inherent in such
determinations, most garnishment statutes now permit garnishment based on
a percentage of total income, thereby eliminating or minimizing the need
for subjective evaluations of expenditures.
Gross, supra note 24, at 123-124 (citations omitted).
Furthermore, "the Federal Government has put a ceiling on the amount above
which the state garnishment statutes may not exceed. Generally, the ceiling is 25%
of the individual's disposable weekly income, with exceptions for court-ordered
spousal or child support payments." See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982); Gross, supra note
24, at 124 n.278:
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establishing objective standards for evaluating the reasonableness of a Chapter
13 debtor's proposed expenditures.
Two final issueg are more related to policy than to the mechanics of the
reasonableness determination. First, does the disposable income test operate
as a disincentive for the debtor to minimize expenditures in the Chapter 13
plan2' and to encourage debtors to schedule discretionary expenditures
during the plan.2
Any belt-tightening on expenses by the Chapter 13
debtor increases the dividend to general unsecured creditors. Thus, the benefit
from reducing expenditures accrues to the creditors, not the debtor. Therefore,
if debtors have been delaying an expenditure due to a lack of funds, they can
potentially pay for it under their Chapter 13 plan at no additional cost by
proposing it as a reasonably necessary expense. For example, one commentator hypothesized that "the debtor's child might need orthodontic work, which
the debtor has been delaying because he does not want to spend the money.
Since that money will go to creditors if it is not used to fix the child's teeth,
it literally costs the debtor nothing to have the work done during the plan
period."2 6 Second, an issue exists as to whether a debtor's dependents
should be forced to make sacrifices under the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. For
example, should a debtor's children be forced to forgo piano lessons during
a Chapter 13 plan? The case law does not directly address these two issues.
They are policy issues, however, that permeate Chapter 13 plans and directly
affect the results from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
B. Summary PrinciplesFrom The Case Law
The case law illustrates there are differences in treatment among the
various categories of expenditures under a Chapter 13 plan, and problems are
unique to each category. Housing expenditures present distinct policy issues.
Any disposable income analysis must consider the Chapter 13 policy objective
for debtors to be able to retain their home. Absent an obviously excessive
expenditure, the debtor should be allowed to continue in the same residence.
The court should determine, however, whether the debtor is living in an

284. "Just as the disposable income standard reduces the debtor's incentive to
earn, so too it reduces the debtor's incentive to minimize expenses." Corish &
Herbert, supra note 2, at 72.
285. "To what extent can the debtor voluntarily increase his 'reasonably

necessary' expenses during the plan period?" Id.
286. Id. The same commentator, however, stated that "[t]here is little indication
in the cases that this has been much of a problem." Id. The commentator speculated

that this could be because creditors are not adept at spotting these discretionary
expenditures on the debtor's schedules. Id.
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unaffordable area or home based on the debtor's level of income. 2 7 The
ultimate question is whether the debtor purchased a home that stretched his
or her budget beyond its limits. If so, the court should require the debtor to
move to a less expensive home before it will confirm the debtor's Chapter 13
plan.28 This approach would help the debtor make expenditure changes that
will enhance the debtor's financial stability long after the plan has ended. A
second consideration is whether the debtor is using Chapter 13 to upgrade
housing at the expense of general unsecured creditors. The court should
determine if the debtor acquired the residence just before filing the bankruptcy
petition to make less disposable income available for the Chapter 13 plan.
Once again, if the answer is yes, the court should require the debtor to move
to more affordable housing as a requisite to plan confirmation.
The courts historically have used the most subjective criteria, and
produced the most varied results, when determining the reasonableness of a
debtor's expenditures for transportation, food, clothing, and recreation. The
reasonableness determination for these expenditures could be made with
reference to objective standards. The courts could establish average cost of
living standards for their particular geographical area. For example, the

debtor's proposed expenditures for transportation and food could be compared
to average monthly costs for the area. Expenditures for clothing and
recreation could be analyzed with reference to established standards based on
a percentage of net income. This approach would account for differences in
cost of living and would allow the debtor reasonable expenditures commensurate with averages for the area.
The most difficult reasonableness determinations for the courts in a
Chapter 13 plan are the expenditures for religious and charitable giving and
parochial and private school education. As discussed supra in Sections II. F.
and II.H. of this Comment, these expenditures present the courts with complex
and difficult social, constitutional, and religious policy considerations. One
approach suggested in the cases, however, would examine the debtor's past

287. See, e.g., In re Rice, 72 Bankr. 311, 312 (D. Del. 1987) (the court found that

the debtors would have been able to make greater payments to their plan had they sold
their expensive home and purchased a more reasonable home for their income level).
288. Id. The court held that the debtors ability to make greater payments to their
plan would "require adjustments on their part which are greater than keeping their new
house at the expense of their unsecured creditors." Id.
One commentator stated as follows:
[i]n most cases, a monthly rental or mortgage payment is the largest single
expenditure in the debtor's budget. If other directly related expenses are included,
such as utility "costs and taxes, the expense grows even larger. If the debtor resides
in large or lavish quarters, the court might
feel compelled by section
1325(b)(1)(B) to withhold confirmation of the debtor's plan until the debtor moves to
less expensive quarters. Morris, supra note 9, at 158.
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behavior to ascertain sincere belief and commitment before filing for Chapter
13. Thus, if the debtor had always contributed to a religious or charitable
organization, or had made parochial or private education a priority, those
expenditures could continue at the same or some reduced level.
C. Suggestions for Debtors and Creditors
Based on an analysis of case law interpreting reasonable expenses under
the disposable income test, debtors and their attorneys can follow some overall
guidelines that should improve their chances for plan confirmation. First,the
debtor should submit an initial Chapter 13 plan that is credible and that
actually reflects the debtor's reasonably necessary living expenses. It is not
an advantageous tactic for a debtor to submit an inflated budget with the
anticipation that he can negotiate the expenses downward if challenged by the
trustee or an unsecured creditor. 289 The courts are skeptical of debtor
credibility when inflated original budgets are replaced by more realistic
budgets, and the courts tend to scrutinize the resubmitted budget to a greater
degree. Second, the debtor can be reasonably confident that housing and
transportation expenses will be allowed unless they are obviously excessive.
Thus, the debtor should consider proposing to sell a luxury car as a part of the
plan. Third, debtors should be very conservative on proposed recreational
expenditures. One commentator advised that "considering the potential for
creditor outrage, debtor's attorneys would be well advised to closely examine
all recreational expenses for reasonableness." 29' Fourth, if debtors intend
to include charitable giving, tithing, or private school education expenditures
in the Chapter 13 plan, they should (1) consider whether they have a credible
history of religious or charitable conviction, (2) limit the amounts to a
reasonable level, and (3) consider proposing a plan longer than three years in
duration.291 If debtors have delayed a discretionary expenditure due to a
lack of funds, they may want to consider proposing it in the plan.292 These
289. "Counsel for debtors shofild perceive that required schedules are not to be
given short shrift in filing a petition for relief, even in a simple Chlpter 7 case.
Instead they should analyze what the real expenses of living in today's world are and
seek to memorialize them in their initial filing." In re Campbell, 63 Bankr. 702, 706
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
290. Butler, supra note 10, at 413.
291. One commentator suggested in regard to proposed religious or charitable
contribution expenditures that "[a] debtor wishing to continue such contributions might
consider extending the plan beyond 36 months to satisfy an objecting creditor." Id.
at 412-13. See infra notes 301-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
issues raised when a debtor extends a Chapter 13 plan past three years.
292. See supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text for a discussion of
proposing discretionary expenses in the plan.
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expenditures, however, would need to be reasonably necessary expenses for
support and maintenance.
Fifth, any proposed contingency fund for
emergencies should be included in the plan as a contingency fund rather than
as a savings account.
Creditors can act in regard to an individual debtor plan or towards
changes in"the Chapter 13 provisions in general. First, creditors should
become more active in objecting to Chapter 13 plans when they believe some
expenditures are unreasonable. 293
Commentators have suggested that
creditors do not actively object to Chapter 13 expenditures because the
amounts involved are not significant enough.294 Creditors cannot complain,
however, about excessive expenditures in Chapter 13 plans if they fail to
object. Second, creditors should develop objective guidelines for determining
reasonably necessary expenses and work to have them adopted by their local
bankruptcy court and Congress. 295 Because creditors extend credit based on
their credit analysis of the debtor's current expenditures and future income, the
creditors are in the best position to suggest objective guidelines for the courts
to follow in determining reasonably necessary expenses 296 For example,

creditors could create dollars-per-month or percent-of-net-income. criteria as
models for the courts to use in their geographic area.

293. One commentator observed that "creditors do not seem to file many
objections to Chapter 13 plans." Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 79.
294. "The amounts of money involved in the typical Chapter 13 case discourage
much creditor activity and have led to the present system in which creditor participation is reduced to a minimum." Id.
295. A commentator observed that
Curiously, it appears that no major creditor has attempted to mitigate this
cost-and make objections economically feasible-by creating hypothetical
'disposable income profiles' for debtors. It would be quite easy for a major
lender to develop such profiles from their own credit scoring systems.
Since those systems are used to measure ability to pay before the loan is
made, they could also be used to measure ability to pay after Chapter 13 is
filed .... Moreover, if courts came to accept such profiles as a baseline
for measuring disposable income,, the need for objections would diminish
as debtor's lawyers learned to draft plans that initially conformed to the
profiles.
Corish & Herbert, supra note 2, at 79.
296. One commentator stated that an "[i]ndustry spokesman noted that a debtor's
anticipated future income was the primary consideration in making consumer loans."
Morris, supra note 9, at 94 (citation omitted).
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D. Weaknesses of CurrentApproaches
Historically, each of the approaches used by the courts to evaluate if a
debtor's expenses are reasonably necessary under a Chapter 13 plan suffers
from identifiable weaknesses. The narrow interpretation of disposable income
under which the court seeks only to remove "luxury" amounts from the
debtor's proposed plan is too limited. If a court only requires a debtor to
reduce expenditures on obvious luxury items, the debtor could upgrade his
basic lifestyle at the expense of his general unsecured creditors. Certainly, the
court should scrutinize a budget for obvious luxuries because "Chapter 13
debtors should not be able to continue the extravagances which put them into
bankruptcy, while their unsecured creditors go unpaid." 297 Thus, although
it is limited, the luxury expenditure test should remain as a baseline requirement for disposable income.
On the other hand, the broad interpretation that seeks to reduce all
debtors to a very basic lifestyle lacks flexibility. Should debtors with different
income levels be required to live at the same expense level? Unsecured
creditors should not be allowed to cry "foul" when they could reasonably
expect a certain level of expenditures based on a borrower's income level.
After all, they extended the credit based on that income level. Also, this
approach raises the issue as to whose values should be used to determine
lifestyle for a debtor at a particular income level. 298
The most feasible approach among the historical approaches to the
disposable income analysis may be the "totality of the circumstances"
approach. Under this approach, the court considers each Chapter 13 plan on
its own merits and analyzes the expenditures as a whole. This approach
allows flexibility for the court and a more equitable determination of the total
picture. One drawback of this approach, however, is the lack of objective
guidelines for the court to follow and an absence of emphasis on the
objectives of maximizing the unsecured creditor dividend and rehabilitating
the debtor.

297. In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 157 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1988). See also In re
Sutliff, 79 Bankr. 151, 157 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Debtors should not be allowed
to continue in the lifestyle that drove them to file bankruptcy and at the expense of
their creditors.").
298. The problem is that "an inquiry into a debtor's 'reasonably necessary'
expenses is unavoidably a judgment of values and lifestyles and close questions
emerge." In re Sutliff, 79 Bankr. 151, 156 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
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E. An Alternative Approach
Based on the foregoing analysis, an alternative approach for determining
reasonably necessary expenses can be developed by combining the suggestions
developed in the Case Law section of this Comment. Any approach should
operate to achieve the three objectives listed at the beginning of this section:
(1) maximum repayment to the unsecured creditors, (2) uniformity and
predictability among the various bankruptcy jurisdictions, and (3) rehabilitation assistance for the debtor. These goals will require a test that limits the
debtor's expenditures according to specific and defined standards. It is
important to remember that requiring a debtor to adjust spending habits is
essential to the debtor's continued financial success after completion of the
Chapter 13 plan. The following is a suggested method of analysis for
proposed expenditures in a Chapter 13 Plan.
1. Eliminate Luxury Expenditures
As a threshold inquiry, the court should determine if a proposed Chapter
13 expenditure is a reasonable expenditure. This initial inquiry is not
concerned with a proposed amount, but rather with a proposed expense. The
court in this step is simply eliminating luxury items from the debtor's Chapter
13 expenditures, such as a luxury boat299 or motor home."
2. Evaluate Expenditures According To Objective Standards
For expenditures deemed reasonable, the court should evaluate the
debtor's proposed Chapter 13 expenditure amounts according to an established
set of objective criteria. These measuring criteria should be established for
each expenditure category and for the Chapter 13 plan as a whole. For
example, standards for specific categories could approximate the following:
(a) Housing: If the debtor is making mortgage payments, the payments
should be allowed unless they are excessive in relation to the debtor's income
or the debtor is using Chapter 13 to upgrade his housing. The court could use
an established standard based on a percentage of net income to evaluate
reasonableness, such as twenty-five percent of net income. A proposed
expenditure for a home mortgage payment below that level would be
presumed reasonable. If the debtor is renting a home or apartment, a similar
standard could be established that is related to net income and family size.
Each jurisdiction would need to establish average rental amounts for its
geographic area.
299. In re Hedges, 68 Bankr. 18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
300. In re Struggs, 71 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
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(b) Expenditures for food, transportation, clothing, recreation, and
contingency needs should also be measured according to an objective standard.
Food and recreation expenses could be compared to established criteria based

on per-person amounts. For example, each jurisdiction could develop tables
that would delineate allowable expenditures for each category based on costs
of living for the geographic area with consideration given to family size and
ages of dependents. Expenditures for transportation and clothing could be
based on a percentage-of-net income standard. Expenditures for all these
expense categories that were within the established criteria would be presumed
reasonable.
(c) Expenditures for charitable giving and private school education
should be discontinued during the course of the plan. An exception could be
allowed for religious contributions and parochial school education. Religious
contributions and parochial education expenditures, however, would be
allowed only if the debtor established a sincere commitment based on past
behavior. An alternative standard for these expenditures would allow them
within a certain maximum percentage of net income. For example, the debtor
could propose contribution expenditures amounting to less than three percent
of net income.
(d) An additional standard should be established for total expenditures.
Under this standard, the debtor's proposed expenditures could not exceed a
specified percentage of net income. For example, seventy-five percent (75%)
could be established as the standard. The debtor's total proposed expenditures
could not exceed seventy-five percent of the debtor's net income. This
standard could be used either as an overall check for the individual categories,
or as the only standard for the debtor's expenditures. If used as the latter, the
court would not evaluate each expense category under established standards,
but would only evaluate the debtor's total expenditures based on this totalexpenditure standard. Thus, the debtor would be allowed any amount of
expenditure in any specific category and the only limitation would be the total
expenditures.
3. Allow Court Discr&ion for Compelling Circumstances
Any approach to evaluating proposed expenditures needs to allow for
judicial discretion based on compelling circumstances in a specific case. It
would be unrealistic to assume that a set of objective criteria could equitably
account for every possible situation. For example, the court could use its
discretion to allow greater amounts of expenditures when a debtor or a
dependent had burdensome health expenditures. The court's discretion,
however, should be limited to compelling circumstances. Otherwise, the goals
of predictability and uniformity would be effectively undermined.
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4. Allow Voluntary Extensions of the Plan Length
Under section 1322(c) of the Code," 1 the debtor's Chapter 13 plan
cannot exceed 36 months in length without a showing of cause. It is unsettled
whether a debtor's desire to increase the dividend to general unsecured
creditors is sufficient cause to allow extension of a Chapter 13 plan beyond
36 months ?02 Many courts, however, allow the debtor to voluntarily extend

301. Section 1322(c) reads iii full:
(c) The plan may not provide for payments over a period that is longer then
three years, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period, but the
court may not approve a period that is longer than five years.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988).
302. There is a split among the bankruptcy courts as to whether a desire by the
debtor to pay a greater dividend to unsecured creditors is sufficient cause for the court
to confirm a plan that is longer than three years in duration. Some courts take the
position tha( it is not sufficient cause. For example, one court held that "a debtor's
desire to increase the dividend paid to general unsecured creditors, without more, does
not rise to the required level for exceeding the prescribed 36 month period." In re
Festa, 65 Bankr. 85, 86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986). The court reasoned that "such
extensions would become routine and would emasculate the statutory preference for
36 month plans." Id. at 87. Another court reasoned that Congress prescribed threeyear plans because of concerns about involuntary servitude if plans went beyond three
years. In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 555 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). The court held that
a desire to pay at least a 70% dividend to general unsecured creditors would be
sufficient cause for extending a plan past three years because, under § 727(a)(9) of the
Code, a 70% dividend would allow the debtor to receive a Chapter 7 discharge without
having to meet the prescribed six year limitation. Id. See also In re Karayan, 82
Bankr. 541, 542-43 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (the court noted three situations in which
extensions are approved: (1) when the debtor proposes to pay a 100% dividend to
unsecured creditors in order to enhance his credit rating, (2) when the debtor desires
to pay at least a 70% dividend to eliminate the applicability of § 727(a)(9), and (3)
when the debtor is allowed to suspend post-confirmation plan payments); In re Wood,
92 Bankr. 264, 266 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Frank, 69 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. C.D.
111 1986).

Other courts, however, have held that a debtor's desire to increase the dividend
to unsecured creditors in his Chapter 13 plan is sufficient cause to approve a plan
longer than three years. One court distinguished Greerby noting that, in those cases,
the debtor did not propose a plan longer than three years and it was the creditors or
trustee who were requesting the plan extension. In re Pierce, 82 Bankr. 874, 883
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). The court concluded that a voluntary plan extension by the
debtor would be sufficient cause to extend the plan. Id.. at 885. Another court
interpreted the debtor's unwillingness to propose a five-year plan as a lack of a good
faith effort to repay unsecured creditors. In re Swan, 98 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1989). Although the court indicated it could not force the debtor to extend his plan
past three years, it refused to confirm the debtor's three year plan because of a lack
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their plan up to the five-year maximum. Thus, one alternative for courts to
allow the debtor more spending discretion under this objective-standards
approach is to allow the debtor to increase expenditures in the Chapter 13 plan
if the debtor proposed to increase the length of the plan.
In an unpublished opinion, In re Ivy, 30 3 the Ninth Circuit implied that
voluntary plan extension could be an alternative for debtors who desired to
include in their Chapter 13 plan an expenditure amount that was not
reasonably necessary. In Ivy, the debtors proposed to tithe to their church in
a Chapter 13 plan that was 36 months in length with a twenty-seven percent
dividend to unsecured creditors. 3(' The bankruptcy court refused to confirm
the plan because the religious contribution was not a reasonably necessary
expense.30 5 The bankruptcy court, however, gave the debtors the option to
include the tithe and extend the plan an additional eighteen months. 306 The
debtors refused to extend their plan and appealed the ruling on constitutional
grounds.30 7 The Ninth Circuit stated that it was not necessary to decide the
constitutional issues because the debtors refused to accept the reasonable
alternative of extending their plan. 33(s The court stated that "in rejecting the
amended plan, the Ivy's instead sought to choose accommodation of their
religious beliefs at the expense of their creditors. We decline to hold that this

of good faith. Id. at 504. See also In re Little, 116 Bankr. 615, 621 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990) ("where, as in the present case, the debtor desires to repay a higher
percentage of her debts the three-year period can be extended, at the debtor's request
and with the court's permission, to as long as five years."); In re Hale, 65 Bankr. 893,
896 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988) (the court, in analyzing a proposed Chapter 13 plan for
good faith, criticized the debtor for not proposing a plan longer than three years "as
they are permitted to do.").
For a thorough discussion of the issues related to extending a Chapter 13 plan
beyond three years for cause, see Comment, Chapter13: "Cause"for Extension Under
Section 1322(c), 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 249 (1987).

303. No. 88-3769 (9th Cir. (Or.) Dec. 10, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
304. Id. at 2.

305. Id. "The court found that the plan's exclusion of the tithe from the amount
of disposable income payable to the Ivy's creditors would effectively require the
creditors to contribute to the Ivy's chosen charity." Id.
306. Id. The court calculated that the extra eighteen months would produce the

same dividend to the general unsecured creditors under the extended plan as a 36
month plan without the expenditures for the tithe would have produced. Id.
307. Id. at 1. The debtors maintained that the bankruptcy court violated their

constitutional right to free exercise of their religion under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. For a discussion of this
constitutional issue, see supra notes 237-263 and accompanying text.
308. Id.
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satisfies the Code's requirements."' 09 Thus, by proposing a plan beyond 36
months, a debtor would commit more payment to the plan and could be
allowed a corresponding increase in unnecessary expenditures. This option
would allow debtors to spend more than is reasonably necessary, while at the
same time maintain the same dividend to general unsecured creditors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The determination of reasonably necessary expenses for a Chapter 13
debtor is a very complex issue because of competing policy objectives:

attempting to give the debtor a fresh start on the one hand and attempting to
repay creditors to the greatest possible extent on the other. 310 The determination is a balancing test for courts because debtors and creditors take a
different view of what constitutes reasonably necessary expenses.3 ' Any
attempt to analyze or establish acceptable levels of plan expenditures,
however, must be made with a view toward accomplishing the threefold
objective of a Chapter 13 plan. First, most courts and commentators
acknowledge that a plan should seek to maximize the dividend to unsecured

309. Id.
310. One court stated the competing goals as:
This Court believes that a debtor should not be permitted to indulge in
luxury expenses during the course of his Chapter 13 plan at the expense of
his creditors. The debtor is entitled to a fresh start, but he is not entitled
to 'lead the life of Riley' .... In this Court's opinion, luxury expenses are
not reasonable expenses necessary for the debtor's support. On the other
hand, a debtor does not have to dedicate his last cent to his creditors; but
is entitled to properly support himself and his dependents in a reasonable
fashion.
In re Ashton, 85 Bankr. 766, 770 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (citations omitted).
311. One commentator stated in regard to Congressional adoption of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) (1988) of the Code that:
Creditors argued that Chapter 13 debtors should reduce or eliminate
entertainment and other nonessential expenses. Representatives of debtor
interests, however, asserted that debtors should not have to live in poverty
before they may qualify for Chapter 13 relief. By adopting the ability-topay test, Congress responded to both of these demands. On the one hand,
debtors cannot continue to spend at a level above what is reasonably

necessary to support themselves and their dependents. Because Congress
primarily aimed the BAFJA consumer bankruptcy amendments at the
excessive spender, the debtor 'cannot expect to 'go first class' when 'coach'
is available.' On the other hand, the ability-to-pay test's 'reasonably
necessary' standard provides enough cushion to ensure that a Chapter 13
debtor will not live in poverty.
Comment, Religious Debtor's,supra note 29, at 881 (citations omitted).
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Second, a few courts recognize there should be some uniformicreditors.
ty to the system. 3 Most courts and commentators, however, forget that one
314
of the major objectives of a Chapter 13 plan should be the rehabilitation
of the debtor. Here, the courts should focus on rehabilitation, not retribution.
After all, what is accomplished if a Chapter 13 plan allows the debtor to
'maintain spending habits that will almost certainly guarantee continued
problems after the plan is completed? Belt-tightening measures should be
implemented to help debtors live within their income and assure financial
success well into the future. Belt-tightening in a retributory fashion that

results in failure of the plan, however, is not beneficial to anyone. The

312. One court stated that the purpose of the disposable income standard of 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988) is to ensure that debtors "are sincerely trying to repay all their
creditors to the best of their ability." In re Compton, 88 Bankr. 166, 168 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1988).
313. "One purpose of the enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) is to create a
benchmark for judging debtors' efforts in cases where the trustee or unsecured
creditors believe that debtors are not making their best effort to repay creditors and are
therefore abusing the bankruptcy process." In re Tracey, 66 Bankr. 63, 66 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1986).
314. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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overriding goal should be a plan that the debtor can complete, because
successful Chapter 13 plans are necessary to maintain debtor and creditor
3u
confidence in the reorganization system.
JAMES RODENBERG

315. The Honorable Judith A Boulden, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the
District of Utah authored an appendix to In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 159-61 (Bankr.
N.D. I11.1989). She stated the following:
The success of Chapter 13 encompasses a value to the system that is larger
than the sum total of the successful Chapter 13's that have been confirmed
and consummated. That value is in establishing and maintaining the
credibility of the Chapter 13 system. That credibility generates creditor
confidence that Chapter 13's are successful, will fairly repay money to
them, can be counted upon to be administered promptly and equitably, and
provide the positive rehabilitation desired in bankruptcy. If the credibility
of the Chapter 13 system generates creditor cooperation and encouragement,
debtors will find their plans more economically and expeditiously confirmed, thus enabling debtors to receive their discharges sooner.
Id. at 160.
She stated that when debtors are unable to complete their plans, "it only serves
to undermine the confidence that creditors have in the system. Repetitive filings, low
repayment plans, attempts to retain expensive consumer items, or liberal budgets, only
to Isic] serve destroy the credibility of Chapter 13 as an equitable means of repayment
and rehabilitation." Id. at 161. Further, the Judge believes that "the integrity and
credibility of the system is dependent in large upon Chapter 13 debtors consummating
plans which repay the maximum amount possible to creditors." Id. at 160. Therefore,
she stated that a debtor must have a "commitment and desire to tepay creditors over
an extended period of time," and that "a plan should not be confirmed when it is
apparent that the sole intent of the debtor is to retain assets, not to repay creditors."
Id. at 160-61. In fact, the Judge went so far as to state that "I believe Chapter 13 was
intended for a relatively select group of individuals." Id. at 160.
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